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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
J Haddadian, Afsaneh. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 
2012. Social Movements’ Emergence and Form: The Green Movement in Iran.  
 
 
 
Theories of social movements suggest that ‘objective’ changes in the structure of political 
opportunities and their interaction with mobilizing and framing mechanisms render a 
system vulnerable to mass protest. By examining the variables relevant to such 
interaction, this study seeks to account for the emergence and form of the 2009 Green 
Movement in Iran. This research uses the congruence method and process traces the 
movement adherents’ activities, mainly their use of Information Communication 
Technologies, and investigates the so-called opposition leaders’ activities and statements. 
The study argues that in accounting for emergence and form of the Green Movement, we 
need to attribute the central role to the bottom-up framing processes that gave value and 
meaning to the movement’s goals and strategies. Political opportunity structures only 
appear in terms of ‘perceptual’ rather than ‘objective’ changes in the structure of the 
system. Further, the research investigates implications for other authoritarian settings 
and, more generally, for theories of social movements. 
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CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
           The study of social movements has proliferated since the political turbulence of 
the 1960s and 1970s. This process began to develop dramatically with an increase in 
European and American scholars’ contacts and collaborations in the field in the 1980s. 
Their collaboration has resulted in exposure to different perspectives that have, according 
to McAdam et al. (1996), undercut the theoretical provincialism characteristic of earlier 
work. Facing cases from different national contexts has forced scholars to adopt a more 
comparative perspective. More recently, the focus in the study of social movements has 
shifted from solely structural, mobilization, or cultural explanations to a more 
comparative perspective reflecting on all three dimensions having arisen from scholarly 
works. Though best known for their emphasis on the political opportunity structures of 
social movements, theorists such as Gamson (1992), Tarrow (1989), and Tilly (1978), 
have also acknowledged the critical catalytic effect of new ideas as a spur to collective 
action. McAdam’s (1982) discussion of the necessity for “cognitive liberation” as a 
prerequisite for mobilization is an acknowledgement of the importance of ideas in the 
political process tradition.  These framing processes undermine the legitimacy of the 
system or its perceived propensity to change. 
  McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) point to a consensus that most political 
movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the 
established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. But these “political 
opportunities,” drawn from rational choice theory, are but a prerequisite to action. In the 
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absence of sufficient organization—whether formal or informal—such opportunities are 
not likely to be seized. Finally mediating between the structural requirements of 
opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and definitions—or frames—
shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement. The impetus to action, thus, is as 
much a cultural construction as it is a function of structural vulnerability. Such change in 
the structure of politics encourages mobilization not only through the “objective” effects 
they have on power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further 
undermine the legitimacy of the system. Expanding political opportunities then acquire 
their causal force from the interaction of those structural and perceptual changes they set 
in motion. A similar reciprocal dynamic defines the relationship between organization 
and framing processes. Framing processes clearly encourage mobilization as people seek 
to organize and act on their growing awareness of a system’s illegitimacy and 
vulnerability. At the same time, the potential for the kind of system critical framing 
processes is conditioned by the population’s access to various mobilizing structures. 
Also, framing processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequences 
under conditions of strong rather than weak organization. The absence of any real 
mobilizing structure would likely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people 
required to afford a basis for collective action.  
In an effort to bring more analytical clarity to the concept, various authors sought 
to specify what they see as relevant dimensions of political opportunities. Among those 
who have offered such schema are Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rutch (1196), 
and Tarrow (1994). McAdam synthesizes these perspectives and identifies four highly 
consensual dimensions of a given system’s “structure of political opportunities” 
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(McAdam, 1996, p.27). These are: first, the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system; second, the stability of that broad set of alignments that 
typically undergird a polity; third, the presence of elite allies; and fourth, the state’s 
capacity and propensity for repression. 
           Although there is a good amount of scholarly work on the impacts of these three 
factors on the emergence of various social movements in the European and American and 
former Soviet states, there is little theoretical analysis of the structure of political 
opportunities and their interactions with resource mobilization and framing processes in 
authoritarian forms of government. The focus of this study is the causal factors that can 
help us understand the emergence of a social movement in an authoritarian setting. One 
of the most recent examples of such collective action is the 2009 Green Movement1 in 
Iran.  Identifying the movement’s emergence and form as the dependent variable, I will 
attempt to test various hypotheses drawn from these three major theoretical frameworks 
(structure of political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing processes) to 
measure the impact of each on the emergence and form of the movement.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
            The 2009 protests over the disputed presidential election results in Iran reminded 
many of the revolutionary course of 1979. Due to the novelty of the phenomenon there 
are still few theoretical explanations for the emergence of the movement and the form it 
has taken thus far. Also, there is little consensus among scholars on the relevance of 
major social movements’ theories to the Green Movement and the central role of political 
                                                
1	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  2009	  summer	  protests	  in	  Iran	  over	  the	  disputed	  presidential	  election	  is	  
contented	  to	  be	  the	  “Green	  Movement.”	  In	  this	  study	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  2009	  mass	  protesters	  both	  as	  the	  
Green	  Movement	  and	  the	  2009	  protests,	  because	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  distinction	  to	  the	  date	  between	  
the	  goals	  and	  aspirations	  of	  the	  two.	  	  
	   4	  
opportunities.  The case presents interesting implications for the study of social 
movements and its most plausible theory to date; that is the interaction between political 
opportunity structures, resource mobilization and framing processes.   
            Due to the absence of theoretical explanations and the uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of the Green Movement, a puzzling research question arises: under what 
conditions can we expect the emergence of a particular type of movement? (e.g., 
grassroots reform movement, civil rights movement, or revolution). This poses a sub-
question: how do political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing 
processes interact to create an environment for success or failure in a given 
movement? McAdam argues that the important implication of the question is that the 
various types of movements are simply different forms of collective action rather than 
qualitatively different phenomena requiring distinct explanatory theories. Rather than 
assuming difference, we need to treat movement type as variable and seek to account for 
variation in type on the basis of particular combination of opportunities, mobilizing 
structures, and collective action frames. 
           To answer these questions, I will conduct in depth analysis of four variables 
impacting the emergence and development of the Green Movement in Iran from 2009 to 
mid-2010. This study will draw upon the political process model—the structure of 
political opportunities, mobilization structures, and framing processes—to identify what 
factors may have contributed to the emergence of the Green Movement and the 
implications of these factors on the form of the movement—bearing in mind that the 
Green Movement is still a developing movement and may take various forms due to a 
particular constellation of identified factors.   
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         Using a single case study research design, this research will employ congruence 
method and process tracing to specifically explore the causal path between the dependent 
and independent variables identified in this study, and the implications for theory 
predictions in general. Three hypotheses drawn from the three theoretical frameworks 
and the literature on social movements in general and Iran’s long history of collective 
actions in particular, will be tested. This work seeks to identify the relevant variables and 
causal mechanisms that contributed to the emergence and form of what some scholars 
thus far, have identified as a non-violent civil rights movement in Iran.2 Also, the 1999 
student protests in Iran will be considered as part of the context in what many scholars 
have called the “cycle of protests.” 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
            The literature on social movements is vast with scholars emphasizing at least one 
dimension of collective action. Increasingly one finds social movement scholars 
emphasizing the importance of three broad theoretical factors in analyzing the emergence 
and development of movements/revolutions. These three factors are 1-the structure of 
political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement, 2- the form of 
organization (informal and formal) available to participants, and 3-the collective process 
of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediates between opportunity 
and action.  
              In this study these dynamics are referred to by their conventional shorthand 
distinctions of political opportunities, mobilizing structure, and framing processes 
(McAdam et al., 1996).  McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) are among the first to put 
                                                
2Parsa	  draws	  on	  the	  non-­‐violent	  aspect	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  argues	  for	  a	  “moral	  capital”	  born	  out	  of	  
Green	  Movement’s	  identities	  of	  adherents.	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political structure, resource mobilization, and framing in a comparative perspective. 
These scholars emphasize the interacting dynamics among these factors in the emergence 
(timing) and form of movements. They argue in favor of the political process proponents 
and share the conviction that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion 
by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive 
to challenge. In their own words “these political opportunities are but a necessary 
perquisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization—whether formal or 
informal—such opportunities are not likely to be seized. Finally mediating between 
structural requirements of opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and 
definitions—or frames—shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement” 
(McAdam et al., 1996, p.8). As stated earlier the focus of this study is on the emergence 
and the form that movements take in the initial stages of collective action, thus I will 
review the scholarly works on the dynamics of political process model—structure of 
political opportunities, Mobilization dynamics, and framing—in emergence and form of 
social movement. 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
           The first modern observer to draw an explicit linkage between states and social 
movements was Alexis de Tocqueville (1955). He provided the first response as to why 
states are so central a focus of the mobilization. Drawing from the French Revolution, he 
argues that centralized states aggrandize themselves by weakening and co-opting the 
intermediate corporate bodies in civil society. The result is that the stronger the state, the 
weaker its encouragement of institutional participation and the greater the incentive to 
confrontation and violence when collective action does break out. 
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            The term “structure of political opportunity” is first used by Peter Eisinger (1973) 
to help account for variations in “riot-behavior” in forty-three American cities. Eisinger 
found that “the incidence of protest is […] related to the nature of a city’s political 
opportunity structure” which he defined as “the degree to which groups are likely to be 
able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (1973, p.25). 
According to McAdam (1996, p.23) this key premise informing the work of Lipsky 
(1970) and Eisinger has been appropriated as the central tenet in a new “political process” 
model of social movements. Since then the timing and emergence is largely viewed to be 
dependent on the opportunities afforded to a particular movement’s adherents by the 
shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power. McAdam 
recognizes the dangers that widespread adoption of political opportunities potentially 
carries. As Gamson and Meyer (1996) note “the concept of political opportunity structure 
is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the 
social movement—political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political 
alliances and policy shifts, […] used to explain too much, it may ultimately explain 
nothing at all” (p.275). 
             In an attempt to shed light on some of these problems stated by various authors3, 
McAdam draws upon three conceptual problems: first, “political” versus other kinds of 
“opportunities”; second,  the dimensions that compose the “political opportunity 
structure”; and third, the very different dependent variables to which the concept has been 
applied. He argues that the kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are most 
defensibly conceived of as political opportunity should not be confused with the 
                                                
3Goodwin,	  Jeff	  and	  Jasper,	  James	  M.	  Rethinking	  Social	  Movements,2004:	  They	  strongly	  criticize	  the	  
political	  process	  model,	  and	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  good	  explanatory	  model	  for	  
social	  movements	  the	  model	  should	  	  draw	  more	  upon	  the	  strategy	  and	  culture.	  
	   8	  
collective processes by which these changed are interpreted and farmed. He also 
acknowledges that while the two are closely related they are not the same; treating them 
as separate preserves the definitional integrity of political opportunities.  
             Synthesizing various authors’ conceptions of relevant dimensions of “structure of 
political opportunity”—Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al (1992), Tarrow (1994)—McAdam 
offers four dimensions of political opportunity: first, the relative openness or closure of 
institutionalized political system; second, the stability or instability of that broad set of 
elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; third, the presence or absence of elite 
allies; and fourth, the state’s capacity or propensity for repression. McAdam 
acknowledges that the only nonconsensual dimension4 he has incorporated into the 
definition is the ability of the state to repress opponents. Some scholars (e.g., dellaPorta, 
1995) have speculated that state repression is really more an expression of general 
receptivity or vulnerability of the political opportunity structure, rather than an 
independent dimension of the same. McAdam casts doubts that state repression is merely 
the result of interest groups within the polity. He draws historical references from the 
1989 Chinese student movement and the 1979 revolution in Iran. Both had to some extent 
the same political opportunities, but in the former communist party hard-liners were able 
to repress the movement, whereas in 1979 the ruling elite was not able to do what the 
Chinese hard-liners had done. This, McAdam argues shows the merit of considering state 
repression as a dimension of political opportunity.  
            In specifying the relevant dependent variable, McAdam asserts that the concept of 
political opportunity has been often used to explain the emergence (timing), and the 
                                                
4Only	  Brockett	  has	  considered	  this	  dimension	  as	  a	  structure	  of	  political	  opportunity	  (McAdam	  et	  al,	  
1996,p.28)	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development (the outcome), as well as the form that the movements take. Seeking to 
understand the emergence of particular movements, the scholars of political process 
sought to link the initial development of insurgency to “expansion in political 
opportunities” beneficial to challenging groups (Costain, 1992; McAdam, 1982).  
            Also, as suggested earlier, movement form is another variable that owes, in part, 
to the nature of the opportunities that set movements in motion. McAdam (1996) asserts 
that “if we array movements along a continuum from the narrowest of institutionalized 
reform effort on the one pole to revolutions on the other, we can, I think, discern a 
general relationship between type of form of movement and changes in dimensions of 
political opportunities” (p.29). He argues that, for example, an expansion of opportunities 
for the opponents in the institutional or legal structure or the emergence of new allies 
within a previously unresponsive political system set in motion the narrowest and most 
institutionalized of reform movements. By narrow McAdam (1996) is referring primarily 
to tactics one can expect such movements to employ, “to extent that the movement has 
mobilized in response to specific changes in access rule, we can expect it to act primarily 
to exploit that new crack in the system” (p.31). According to McAdam, as we move 
toward the more radical or even revolutionary end of movement continuum, the other two 
dimension of political opportunity come increasingly into play, a significant decrease in 
either the will or the ability to repress and the development of significant divisions among 
previously stable political elites, are related to a more non-institutionalized and 
revolutionary forms of protest.  
          Finally, McAdam (1996) turns to the international context of political opportunities 
as a dimension that influences the movements. He cites several works done on the 
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international political pressures in expanding the opportunities for movements’ adherents 
(Salama Layton, 1995; Wang, 1989; Marks and McAdam, 1993). Shifting international 
conditions is a variable considered important in encouraging mobilization in domestic 
arenas. 
              Zirakzadeh (1997) looks at Germany’s Green, Poland’s Solidarity, and Peru’s 
Shining Path movements, in a comparative perspective. Citing works of other scholars 
such as McAdam (1989), Migdal (1974), Powell (1971), Smith (1991), he asserts that 
constitutions, national level policies, policy making processes, and inter-governmental 
struggles over power profoundly influence both people’s decisions to participate and the 
strategies and tactics that a movement adopts. Also, he asserts that some social problems 
and political arrangements such as economic repression or intense electoral competition 
may generate splits among government officials and may lead factions to seek allies 
among groups of the non-wealthy. 
            Zirakzadeh (1997) argues that an alliance between a fledging movement and 
governing faction might occur that temporarily protects the participants from state 
harassment, and this may persuade more people to join the movement (p.14). Although 
he is analyzing what most scholars call the “new social movements” mostly akin to 
movements that occurred after the 1960s in Europe, his application of a political process 
model as a way to account for various pathways of these three movements is 
enlightening.  
             In an analysis of states and opportunities and the snow balling effects of 
movements on one another, Tarrow (1996) points out that movements appear at the 
subnational and subgroup level, they rise and fall and change their shapes rapidly during 
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cycles of protest, and they are profoundly influenced by trends that transcend national 
boundaries. According to him these three dimensions of movement dynamics: infra-
national variations, cycles of protest, and transnational collective action play a vital role 
in shaping a movement. He asserts that in age of satellite communication, global 
television, and fax machines, even movements that are independent of one another have 
almost instant access to information about what other movements are doing. In the case 
of democratization movements of 1989, we saw a transnational movement which 
employed similar strategies and rhetoric and which the late- comers learned from their 
predecessors (p.53). 
           Also defining the structure of political opportunity, Tarrow (1996) asserts that he 
refers to “consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—signals to 
social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal 
resources to form social movements” (p.54). He makes it clear that his concept of 
political opportunity not only emphasizes formal structures like state institutions, but the 
conflict and alliance structures which provide resources and impose constraints external 
to the group. Unlike money or power, this kind of opportunity opens windows that even 
weak or disorganized challengers can take advantage of to organize against powerful 
opponents. Conversely, as opportunities narrow, even the strong grow weak and 
movements are forced to change their form of action and strategies. 
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
           McCarthy (1996), in an effort to illuminate how mobilizing structural forms 
emerge and evolve, how they are chosen, combined, and adopted by social movement 
activists, and how they affect movements, asserts that political opportunity and strategic 
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framing are particularly important in analyzing these processes. He acknowledges that 
“by mobilizing structures,” he means those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective 
action, which include particular “tactical repertoires,” “particular social movement 
organizational” forms, and “modular social movement repertoires.” He also includes the 
range of everyday life micro-mobilization structural social locations that are not aimed 
primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these 
include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and 
elements of state structure itself (p.141). 
           By doing so McCarthy (1996) tries to systematically account for different 
movement mobilizing structural configurations. He notes that a comparative analysis of 
varying political opportunity structures and differential strategic framing approaches in 
the dynamics of social movements across nations and time, demand to do so. Attempting 
to map these structures in a society, he asserts that at the least formally organized end of 
the map are “families” and “networks of friends” (p.142).  It is upon these most basic 
structures of everyday life that much local dissent is built. These structures are in line 
with McAdam’s widely adopted phrase, “micro-mobilization contexts” that suggest a 
wide variety of social sites within people’s daily rounds where informal ties between 
people can serve as solidarity and communication facilitating structures when and if they 
choose to engage into dissent together. 
            Tilly (1978) used the notion of “netness” to account for movement adherents by 
the denseness of their social relations that are created by these many institutional ties. 
Others have used notions such as “communities of memory” (networks of demobilized 
activists) (Woliver, 1993), “subcultures of dissent” (Obserschall, 1996), and “protest 
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infrastructure” (Gamson and Schmeidler, 1984), to account for the role of informal 
structures of everyday life in mobilization.  
              According to McCarthy, closer to the more organized end of the continuum are 
informal networks created primarily as mobilizing structures. Tilly (1978) recognizes 
other sub-groups that “can also be the building blocks during protest campaigns.” These 
classes of mobilizing structures are hybrids in that they are more organized, but they 
operate within existing organizations/institutions; “prayer groups, caucuses, study groups, 
sports teams, commissions,” (p.143) are examples of such groups. Social Movement 
Organizations (SMOs) are the more organized form of these protest blocks and serve as 
movements’ dedicated mobilizing structures. SMOs exhibit wide variations in 
institutional forms. One is the “independent local,” volunteer based group emblematic of 
our image of the “grassroots” group (Lofland, 1985), but many local groups are tied to 
national structures—some federated into coalitions, many others branches of strong 
national organization.  
              McCarthy (1996) categorizes the range of building blocks of mobilizing 
structures primarily by their degree of organizational formalization and centralization as 
well as their formal dedication to social changes goal. He argues that describing this 
variation in extensive and systematic detail enables us to abstract its important 
dimensions, in order to describe typical sub-movement, movement, movement industry, 
and movement family, historical and national profiles of mobilizing structure (p.144). He 
acknowledges that in any concrete social setting, a range of mobilizing structures are 
more or less available to activists as they attempt to create new movements or nurture and 
direct old ones. Activists must choose among their constituent elements and the choices 
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they make have consequences for both the intensity and shape of collective mobilization 
as well as in expanding or constraining the range of political outcomes it can provide. 
            McCarthy also discusses the interrelationship between political opportunities, 
framing and the mobilizing structures. He asserts that more stable elements of political 
opportunity are central in shaping the available range of mobilizing structure in the 
longer run, and more volatile elements of political opportunity are important in 
understanding the shorter run choices among those available structures that activists 
make. Also, particular mobilizing structures (such as leadership style, availability of 
resources, organization, networks of individuals/activists) will be more or less useful in 
taking advantage of a particular political opportunity.  
            In an attempt to consider different aspects of political opportunities, various 
authors have built upon the concept. Kriesi (1996) identifies a more stable element of 
political opportunity structures as the “general political context” which incorporates the 
strength of the state and its typical degree of its response to challengers. Rucht (1996) 
employs the idea of “context structure” which conflates natural, social, and political 
contexts, although he pays most attention to the political context. In doing so, he tries to 
link resource mobilization approaches and political opportunity to assess the impact of 
external opportunities on movement structures.  
             For the sake of clarity, Rucht specifies key categories. Social movements consist 
of two kinds of components: first, networks of groups and organizations prepared to 
mobilize for protest actions to promote or resist social change; and second, individuals 
who attend protest activities or contribute resources without necessarily being attached to 
movement groups or organizations. Mobilization is the process of creating movement 
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structure and preparing and carrying out protest actions, which are visible movement 
products addressed to actors and public outside the movement. Rucht (1996) asserts that 
for large scale and sustained movement activities mobilization requires resources such as 
people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technological tools to process and 
distribute information and to influence people (p.186). By movement structure he refers 
to the organizational bases and mechanisms serving to collect and use the movement’s 
resources.  
            Movement structure can serve other purposes beyond mobilization, such as 
disseminating information within the movement, forging a collective identity, or 
satisfying the personal interests of the movement leaders. Rucht then distinguishes three 
forms of movement structure: first, the Grassroots model, characterized by a relatively 
loose, informal, and decentralized structure, emphasis on unruly, radical protest politics, 
and a reliance on committed adherents; second, the interest group model, characterized 
by an emphasis on influencing politics and a reliance of formal organization; and third, 
the party oriented model, characterized by an emphasis on the electoral process, party 
politics, and, reliance on formal organization.  
Further Rucht asserts that in case of structural setting of a movement, the authors 
in the volume edited by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald are looking for those 
environmental elements that shape movements’ forms or activities. More concretely, the 
authors are interested in those conditions external to a given movement which either 
restrict or facilitate the building and maintenance of movement structure devoted to 
conducting protest activities. What makes this context relevant to the movement is that it 
involves resources and conditions beyond a movement’s control. The movement can 
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realize its potential to be strong and successful to the extent it takes this context into 
consideration and makes it resonant by structural attunement, strategic calculation, and 
clever use of leverage points. This requires an identification and “exploitation” of 
patterns that work in favor of the movement (e.g., dissatisfaction of the people with the 
established elites) and the avoidance of that which could weaken it (e.g., loss of powerful 
allies).  
Building upon the role of mobilizing structures, Zirakzadeh (1997), emphasizes 
the role of leadership in mobilizing resources and asserts that a movement for and by 
discontent people only appears after alliances are forged between an aggrieved 
constituency and a group or person who has the appropriate political experience, vision, 
or resource to help that constituency. Emergence of a movement then requires an “issue 
entrepreneur” who is able to attract resources. He also treats what many scholars call 
Social Movement Organizations or SMOs (McAdam et al., 1996), as the “indigenous-
community” approach. That is how local level social institutions, such as neighborhood 
clubs, union clubs, and community churches, can provide organizational building blocks, 
communication networks, and leadership skills for later social movements. He notes 
“social movements thus arise naturally out of people’s daily, local, and largely apolitical 
patterns of social interaction” (1997, p.14).  Also regarding the political structure 
surrounding movements, he acknowledges that constitutions, national level policies, and 
policy making processes, and intergovernmental struggles over power profoundly 
influence both people’s decisions to participate in a movement and the strategies and 
tactics that a movement adopts. Zirakzadeh asserts:  
according to almost all the newer generation of social movement theorists, a 
leader of a fledging movement cannot create and control the movement simply by 
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peddling exciting ideas about change or by vilifying a minority population. Before 
and aspiring leader can hope to be influential, a broader constellation of political 
circumstances and associational ties has to be in place (p.15). 
 
FRAMING PROCESSES 
            Justifications for strategic choices are discussed in the context of definitions of 
relative opportunity and these are recurrent sources of contention within movements. 
Framing consensus, then, is variable between movements and typically a contentious 
internal process, and the definition of opportunity is often at the center of what is most 
contentious. This suggests that we need to focus on this process of defining opportunity 
and its dynamics. 
           McAdam (2000), with the notion of “cognitive liberation,” has identified four 
general types of “expanding cultural opportunities” that appear to increase the likelihood 
of movement activity (p.254). These four are: first, the dramatization of a glaring 
contradiction between a highly salient cultural value and conventional social practice.  
Second, “suddenly imposed grievances”, the notion is first used by Walsh (1981). This 
cognitive stimulus to framing processes describes those dramatic, highly publicized, and 
generally unexpected events (i.e. human made disasters, court decisions, official 
violence) that increase public awareness and opposition to previously accepted social 
conditions. Third, dramatization of a system’s vulnerability or illegitimacy. And fourth, 
the availability of what Snow and Benford (1988) term  “master protest frames” within 
which subsequent challengers can map their own grievances and demands.  
            According to McAdam (2000), movements tend to cluster in time and space 
because they are not independent of each other. For example, he argues the rash of 
student movements that flourished around the globe (in Spain, France, Germany, Mexico, 
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Japan, Italy, and the United States) in 1968 were clearly attuned to and influenced by one 
another, resulting in development and diffusion of a “student left master frame” (p.258).  
By the same token, the success of Poland’s Solidarity in finally breaking the communist’s 
party monopoly on power encouraged other Eastern European dissidents to adopt 
prodemocracy frames in their own countries. The more general theoretical point is that 
successful framing efforts are almost certainly influenced by other groups to re-interpret 
their situations in light of the available master frame and to mobilize based on the new 
understandings of themselves and the world around them. Thus, the presence of such a 
frame constitutes yet another cultural or ideological resource that facilitates movement 
emergence.  
          Mayer Zald (1996) sketches six topics in the interplay of movements, framing, and 
larger society (p.261). First is the cultural construction of repertoires of contention and 
frames. Second, since framing takes place on the context of larger societal processes, she 
discusses the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical events in providing 
opportunities for framing. Since frames are generated by a diverse set of actors in 
relations to a variety of audiences inside and outside of the movement, she argues the 
third topic for attention is framing as a strategic activity. The fourth topic for Zald is 
competitive processes that represent the context in which frames are selected and come to 
dominate. Since frames are contested, within the movement by leaders and cadre 
debating alternative goals and visions for the movement, and externally by 
countermovement actors, bystanders, and state officials who oppose the movement. Fifth, 
frames are transmitted and reframed within the mass media. Finally, he argues we must 
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understand how political opportunity and mobilization intersect to shape the outcomes of 
framing competition (p.262).  
              Zald asserts that culture, ideology, and strategic framing are linked because they 
are the topics that deal with the content and processes by which meaning is attached to 
objects and actions. Culture, he argues, is the shared beliefs and understandings mediated 
by and constituted by symbols and language of a group or society. Ideology is the set of 
beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to 
interpret the political world. Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, 
and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and 
to suggest alternative modes of action. 
             The issue of how social movements innovate and change has been linked to 
cultural analysis through the notions of repertoires of contention and cultural tool kits. 
Although Tilly is largely considered structuralist, his notion of “repertoires of action” 
(1978) recognized and gave legitimacy to the notion of innovation and learning of 
repertoires of contention. More recently, Ann Swidler’s idea of “culture as tool kit” gives 
a framework for thinking about institutional learning and the bricolage process by which 
components of the cultural stock are assembled into specific models, or exemplars, of 
socially defined behavior.  
             Focusing on the societal and media context of framing, and framing as a strategic 
activity, Zald (1996) clarifies that social movements exist in a larger societal context. 
They draw on the cultural stock for images of what is an injustice, or what is a violation 
of what ought to be (p.266). Contemporary framing of injustice and of political goals 
almost always draw upon the larger societal definitions of relationships, of rights, and of 
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responsibilities to highlight what is wrong with the current social order, to suggest 
directions for change. Similarly, movements draw on cultural stock on how to protest and 
how to organize, “the templates of organization include skills and technologies of 
communication, of fund-raising, of running an office, of recruiting members. Repertoires 
of contention include bombing buildings, building barricades, organizing marches, non-
violent disruption, and the like”(Zald, 1996, p.267). Further, he acknowledges that social 
movements, their leaders, and participants are differentially situated in social structure. 
As such they draw upon the repertoires and frames available to and compatible with the 
skills, orientations, and styles of groups that make them up.  
           Moreover, Tilly (2009) calls attention to cultural breaks and cultural contradictions 
that lead to action and policy imperatives only as they are defined in an active process of 
cultural and movement construction. Political and mobilization opportunities are often 
created by cultural breaks and the surfacing of long dormant contradictions that reframe 
grievances and injustice and the possibility of action. Cultural contradictions occur and 
lead into mobilization when two or more cultural themes that are potentially 
contradictory are brought into active contradiction by the force of events, or when the 
realities of behavior are seen to be substantially different than the ideological 
justifications for the movement.  
          Discussing the role of media in framing, Tilly (2009) acknowledges that these 
interactions occur through various from of media—newspapers, books, pamphlets, radio, 
and television. Also, movement activists may debate in coffeehouses, in meeting halls, 
etc., but they have to change the ideas and mobilize bystander publics, many of whom 
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may only know of the movement’s goals and visions only slightly, or through the media 
controlled by the dominant system/state.  
           Zirakzadeh (1997) also refers to framing processes as “fashioning identities” in the 
study of social movements. He cites many scholars who believe that ‘culture,’ broadly 
understood as how we interpret social arrangements, how we see our places within these 
arrangements, and how we see our immediate opportunities, powers, and limitations, 
profoundly informs and shapes our political actions. Accordingly patterns of social and 
personal cognition and patterns of political action should not be treated as unrelated 
phenomena. He recognizes two sub-sets of identity-formation theory as “popular culture” 
approach and “autonomous movement-culture” approach. The former holds that rich 
cultural currents are being constantly developed by ordinary people in restaurants, cafes, 
streets, and the cyber space, where people speak about their sufferings and ways how to 
approach them.   
           As an example, African-Americans who joined the Communist Party in 1930s 
accepted many Leninist ideas but also held onto notions of Black Nationalism that Party 
leaders strongly opposed. The result was a complex process of factional conflict, 
ideological compromise, and cultural cross-pollination within the party.  According to 
this approach, to understand a social movement one should pay attention to first, the 
specific local popular culture context; second, cultural diversity; and third, the inevitable 
consequent ideological conflict within the movement.  
The autonomous movement approach holds that the social movement themselves 
are climates, environments, in which new subversive ideas are invented and nurtured. 
This identity formation process also questions the legitimacy of the power holders in 
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many ways, despite elites’ efforts to influence the thinking of non-elites, the latter 
repeatedly question the elite’s definition of reality in the daily expressions of popular 
culture and within organized social movements. Social movements thus should be 
understood as manifestations of ongoing cultural struggle between the haves and the have 
nots, over how to understand and whether to tolerate current inequalities. Thus 
movement’s goals, priorities, and tactics can be identified once we see through its 
participants’ lenses.  
            Anthoney Oberschall (1993) in his evaluation of opportunities and framing in the 
Eastern Europe revolts of 1989, asserts that in analyzing movements four dimensions can 
be usefully distinguished: first, discontents and grievances; second, ideas and believes 
about justice and injustice, right and wrong, and more comprehensive ideologies through 
which discontents and issues are framed, and institutions and leaders evaluated and 
criticized; third, the capacity to act collectively or mobilization of a challenger; and 
fourth, political opportunity. 
            Oberschall considers lack of state legitimacy and ineffectiveness as an 
opportunity for opponents. Since it is ineffective, it cannot expect compliance based on 
expediency or interest, or only from a limited number of incumbents and privileged 
clients. Bereft of legitimacy, the regime must then survive on fear and the threat of force. 
This perceived lack of legitimacy is framed by “ideas and beliefs about right and wrong, 
justice and injustice, and more systematic ideologies composed of cognitive images and 
moral evaluations, with which people interpret and frame their discontents, evaluate their 
circumstances, define public issues, and demand public action” (Oberschall, 1993, p.97). 
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Framing and interpretation thus are social processes for articulating a variety of private 
beliefs and preferences into shared meanings and values for joint action. 
            Also, acknowledging that the suddenness of 1989 opposition movements 
precludes the organizational resources stressed by Zald and McCarthy (1987), Oberschall 
asserts block recruitment of viable communities and associations does not operate when 
there are no blocks to recruit. The theoretical issue is how spontaneous mass 
demonstrations developed and how dissidents joined them to form an opposition 
movement. When leaders and SMOs emerge on the back of mass demonstrations, the 
accent shifts from SMOs to the diffusion of a protest culture and a collective action 
repertoire (Tilly, 1978), from organization variables to loosely structured collective 
action, shared symbols and collective identity.  
             Finally, Elena Zdravomylsova (1996), in analyzing opportunities and framing in 
Russia’s transitions to democracy, shows how political opportunities, expanding and 
shifting their locus in the course of the political cycle, encouraged different preferences in 
framing and corresponding symbolism of democratic social movements. She believes 
reciprocal the social movement’s framing influenced the expansion of political 
opportunities. She distinguishes two types of social movement organizations in the 
process—radical  and moderate—and argues that the disruptive tactics of radical SMOs 
were useful in beginning a protest cycle, but that was not efficient for action 
mobilization. On the other hand, she asserts that symbolic framing of reformist SMOs 
was appropriate to electoral mobilization at the peak of the protest cycle, and thus aided 
the democratic success in 1990 elections.  
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IRAN: THE CONTEXT: 1999 STUDENT PROTESTS 
          Tarrow (1996), points out that movements appear at the subnational and subgroup 
level, they rise and fall and change their shapes rapidly during cycles of protest, and they 
are profoundly influenced by trends that transcend national boundaries. In this study the 
1999 student protests will be considered as the context and a part of a cycle of protest to 
demand civil rights and liberties prior to the emergence of the Green Movement, as 
students and youth are a major part of the Iranian population and a great degree of their 
demands correlates with those of union workers and women’s rights activists. Thus some 
literature on the phenomenon will be reviewed here. Also the Iranian diaspora has been 
active during the height of the 2009 protests to disseminate information and gather 
international support for the demonstrators.  
            Many scholars discussing the 1999 student protests trace the root causes of this 
collective action to gain civil rights back to the early days of the 1979 revolution. The 
causes for this activism to gain civil rights discussed by scholars are: the age factor, a 
political cultural transformation, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the influence of 
religious intellectuals, the influence of “print-media”, and the role of technologies. 
           The fact that two-thirds of Iran’s population is now under 30 is discussed by many 
scholars. Mashayekhi (2001) asserts “young people, particularly in the third world, have 
been most sensitive and emotional about, social, political, and economic issues” (p.290).  
Further, Afshari and Graham (2007), point to the fact that many of the Iranians were not 
even born during the Revolution, and thus “the under-30 generation knows current 
Supreme Leader’s autocracy better than his predecessor Khomeini’s revolutionary zeal” 
(p.89). 
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          Mashayekhi (2001) argues for a new “political subculture” of the student 
movement in Iran and asserts “this political cultural transformation is rooted in a myriad 
of social, economic, generational, political, intellectual and global developments” (301). 
He discusses “the failure of Islamic utopianism,” in the sense that until 1980s students 
themselves were among the most dedicated and ideologically connected to the Islamic 
Revolution’s values and ideology and thus the failures of the system in the first decade 
were blamed on the subversive role of “imperialism” or the “imposed war” with Iraq or 
so on. When the war ended, Mashayekhi argues, “a chain of eye-opening events began to 
disillusion this idealistic and dedicated generation of students” (p.302). Boroumand 
(2007), also points to events such as: the defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, the removal of 
Ayatollah Montazeri from his position, and a series of financial scandals and corruptions 
on the part of the regime’s leading officials. The result, as Afshari and Graham (2007), 
and Jahanbegloo (2000) assert, is the emergence of a “non-ideological” (p.136) 
generation. Mashayekhi calls this shift the “de-ideologization” process among 
revolutionary students.  
          Another factor contributing to this political activism against the Islamic Republic 
values and policies discussed by the scholars is the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both 
Mashayekhi and Boroumand (2007), argue that the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
defeat of the Marxist Left in the early years of the revolution weakened the ‘ideological 
and intellectual influences of Marxism and Socialism as political and economic 
alternative for students,’ and has weakened the veterans’ beliefs in revolutionary 
orthodoxy.  Thus by the mid-1990s, revolutionary political Islam and socialist ideals were 
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losing and liberal-nationalist discourse and democratic practices were gaining 
momentum. 
          Many authors discuss the influence of religious intellectuals on the student 
movements. Bayat (2007), asserts that the “post-Islamism” in Iran today has had 
influence on three main areas: the redevelopment of the Tehran municipality and its 
socio-spatial rationale; the Alternative “Thought Movement” led by Soroush; and Islamic 
feminism. Many authors like Mashayekhi have mentioned the modernist and democratic 
readings of Islam by Islamic thinkers such as Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, ziba-Kalam and 
others, and the enthusiasm which the students showed for these interpretations.  Afshari 
and Graham (2007) assert that “the youth have forged a way to reconcile modernity and 
their changing cultural preferences with the traditionalist interpretation of Shi’ite Islam 
espoused by the state” (p.83).  
         The contribution of the press or the “print-media” as Mashayekhi puts it, is another 
factor influencing the student movement. Mahdi (1999) also stresses the role of these 
journals. With television and radio in the state’s domination, media outlets including the 
monthly “Kiyan” and Tabarzadi’s the “Student Massage” were tools to promote concepts 
such as democracy and human rights. 
         The role of technologies is also discussed. Afshari and Graham (2009,) argue that 
new technologies ease cultural change. By the same token, Mashayekhi points out that 
“not all the sources of the emerging democratic political subculture are domestic” 
(p.303). He asserts that “cultural globalization and information technology” (p.304) have 
its impacts on civil society, especially among the youth and students. 
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           Finally, Mashayekhi presents a structural analysis of social movements, discussing 
the linkage between “the structure of political opportunities” (p.299) and movement 
activities. The first structural feature of the Islamic Republic benefiting the political 
student activism is the nature of its pluralistic factional politics. The second one is the 
fact that the Islamic Republic is a young system; Mashayekhi argues that many of the 
leading officials still had linkages to the middle and pre-revolutionary intellectual class or 
the Office for Consolidating Unity (OSU), Iranian student’s largest pro-reform 
organization, and these linkages gave the students the power of mobilization. 
THE GREEN MOVEMENT  
  Ramin Jahanbegloo5 describes the Green Movement as a transitional tool for 
Iranian society that has led to the country's civic maturity. He argues that a “moral 
capital,” which guaranties consistency of the protest through varying tactics has 
flourished among Iranian citizens. Jahanbegloo asserts that the movement has two 
principle characteristics in terms of its image: first, it is a ‘truth-seeking’ movement; and 
second, it is ‘non-violent.’ The non-violent strategy, he argues, would be able to pave the 
way for future democracy in the country. The refusal to engage in “retribution in kind” in 
terms of violence, has called into question the legitimacy of the very essence of violence; 
people want to break out of the vicious cycle of violence, he asserts. He also points that 
the civil society is not expressing its demands in an ideological fashion, but is pursuing 
its goals in the shape of a civil movement, and through civil protest methods. For 
Jahanbegloo, the most vital condition for the movement to be successful is that it would 
not turn onto an ideological path and stay non-violent. 
                                                
5	  Boghrati,	  N.	  (2010,	  May).	  Jahanbegloo	  on	  the	  Green	  Movement	  in	  Iran.	  Worldpress.	  Retrieved	  from	  :	  
http://worldpress.org/Mideast/3540.cfm	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          Drawn from the literature, the dynamics of political opportunity structure, resource 
mobilization, and strategic farming in the emergence and form 2009 Green Movement, 
are thus summarized in the Political Processes Dynamics figure below: 
1.1. Political Process Dynamics Figure  
 
Structure of political 
opportunity 
Mobilizing structures Strategic framing 
Openness/closure of the 
system  
Leaders Ideologies/identities 
(perceived legitimacy) 
Cracks among elites Grassroots/SMOs   Information Technologies 
Elite allies  Information Technologies Informal social movement 
networks 
The degree of repression Informal social movement 
networks 
 
International 
pressure/Isolation 
  
State’s centralization of 
economic power 
  
Failed reforms   
 
PROCEDURE 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
           The Green Movement’s emergence and its short-term viability and form6 is the 
dependent variable. What factors cause the timing (emergence) of a particular type of 
social movement in an authoritarian setting? How do political opportunity structures, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes interact to create an environment for short-
term viability (form) in a given movement?  To answer these questions, I will conduct an 
                                                
6Scholars	  such	  as	  Dabashi	  (2009),	  and	  Jahanbegloo	  (2010)	  consider	  the	  Green	  Movement	  a	  civil	  rights	  
movement.	  Seeking	  to	  achieve	  freedom,	  democracy,	  and	  basic	  human	  rights.	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in depth analysis on the emergence and development of the Green Movement in Iran 
from 2009 until mid-2010, which marked the end of the large-scale demonstrations. 
             Building on Zirakzadeh’s (1997) definition, this study defines social movements 
as non-elite attempts to transform societies radically through complex mixtures of 
socially disruptive and non-disruptive tactics. Also borrowing from McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald (1996), political opportunities are defined in terms of changes in the 
institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system. 
The interactions of the four consensus dimensions of political opportunities identified by 
McAdam with other variables will be examined by this study. By mobilizing structure, 
this study refers to those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which 
people mobilize and engage in collective action. In terms of framing processes, the aim of 
this study is “strategic framing,” that is conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action. This study will explore the framing of the ideas about right or 
wrong to nourish the movement’s goals as adherents weigh their options for taking action 
in the movement. As this study seeks to establish the interaction between political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes, the strategic framing sheds 
lights at various dimensions of this interaction. 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
             The independent variables analyzed in this study are: (1) the availability of 
aggravated classes (grassroots identities and informal social movement networks), (2) the 
use of information communication technologies, (3) Ideologies (including the perceived 
illegitimacy or legitimacy), and (4) the availability of a strong leadership.  
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            There is much evidence of a non-ideological, post-charismatic, and 
technologically advanced social movement culture in Iran today. As many consider the 
current movement a “non-ideological” or “post-ideological” movement, breaking away 
from the communist, leftist, or Islamic ideologies of 1970s, I will look at this new 
identity to attempt to determine its nature and its goals and ideas of its constituencies in 
the strategic framing of their protests. This study will analyze the implications of such 
factors in terms of its short-term success and the interaction of structure, organization, 
and framing.  
          As mentioned earlier in the literature review, many factors have impacted the 
emergence, form, and short-term viability of the Green Movement (these factors are 
summarized in figure 1.1.). However, recognizing the scope of this study, there are 
limitations in performing sufficient analysis on all of these factors. This study will focus 
on four of these factors as independent variables, leaving room for the discussion of other 
variables in interaction with these four. The four independent variables chosen have 
directly impacted the movement and reflect on current trends in political and social lives 
of Iranians and not the structure of the Islamic Republic’s system. The interaction 
between the structure and the mobilizing and framing processes will then be discussed in 
the fourth chapter in this study.  
HYPOTHESES 
           Identifying these variables I hypothesize that:  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Political opportunity structures are constantly impacted by mobilizing 
structures and framing processes. In the case of the Green Movement’s emergence and 
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form, the central role should be given to the framing processes rather than the political 
opportunity structures. 
            To operationalize the implications for framing processes, I will investigate socio-
cultural structures and identities of the grassroots with a focus on Internet users and 
bloggers. The historical context of Internet usage will also be examined. Framing 
strategic options is important in a social movement context, and this framing happens by 
way of conversations, discussion, deliberation, and decision-making on the part of 
movement adherents.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: The grassroots identities and the use of information communication 
technologies have had a positive impact on the emergence and form of the 2009 Green 
Movement; 
         To investigate this impact, I will analyze the new uses of technology during the 
movement, including the many crafty ways in which citizen activists worked to 
circumvent the limits on social media posed by the regime. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the absence of a strong charismatic leadership within the Green 
Movement, there have been limitations on the short-term success of this movement. 
         To determine the impact of the leadership in the Green Movement, this study will 
look at the so-called opposition faces, Mousavi and Karoubi, their political orientations, 
goals, and statements during the 2009 protests. This study will also analyze the cracks 
among elites, which indicate a shift in the structure of political opportunities by 
contracting the opposition leader’s views to those of more reformist, conservative, and 
hardline persuasions during the protests. These individuals mainly include Iran’s former 
reformist president, Mohammad Khatami; Iran’s former president and current chairman 
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of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; Iran’s current president, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad; and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.  
METHODOLOGY 
           Examining one social movement in Iran, in a disciplined configurative case study, 
this work will utilize a longitudinal study, over the course of the movement to observe 
changes in the variables: I use the congruence method and process tracing to begin to 
explain the emergence and form of the movement. The political process theory; that is the 
interaction of political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and framing 
processes, is considered as the theoretical framework of this thesis. George and Bennett 
(2005) state “congruity” is an important general standard for congruence tests; that is 
“similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized caused and observed 
effects” (183), in comparison with theory predictions. The dependent variable thus will 
be investigated both in terms of its causal relationship with the independent variables and 
its congruity with theory’s predictions.  
In order to establish the causal path, I will conduct in process tracing. According 
to George and Bennett (2005), “the process tracing method attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (p.206). 
Thus the within-case study would be enough for examining the hypothesis and for theory 
testing.  A disciplined configurative case study can contribute to theory testing “because 
it can impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not, and it can serve 
heuristic purposes by highlighting the need for new theory in neglected areas”(George 
and Bennett, 2005, p.75). 
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           The case of the Green Movement in Iran presents a critical and a thorough test for 
the purpose of this study and may contribute to theory development. The images of 
thousands of protesters in 2009 reminded many of the revolutionary course of 1979. The 
question arises about under what conditions has it turned to, as many scholars now 
discuss it, a non-violent, civil rights movement? In the era of information technologies 
and globalization, are current theories of social movement sufficient to explain the 
emergence and form of this movement? According to McAdam (1996) the various types 
of movement are simply different forms of collective action rather than qualitatively 
different phenomena requiring distinct explanatory theories. The dependent variable in 
this study is the emergence and form that the Green Movement has taken thus far.  
Using political process theory (the interaction between structure of political 
opportunity, resource mobilization theory, and framing processes), this study will seek to 
account for variations in the independent variables to determine whether or not we can 
establish causal mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. This thesis will analyze 
participation of movement adherents through process tracing with an eye on how the 
participants used and took advantage of the Information Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) in organizing and framing their collective action. Also, in the third chapter, the 
degree to which participants appear to respond to the so called leaders’ demands and the 
degree to which leaders are influenced by the movement’s demands are going to be 
analyzed through process tracing.  
          The study will seek to examine whether we need afford the central role to the 
framing processes rather than the structure of political opportunities in order to account 
for the emergence and form of the Green Movement. Studying this case will also shed 
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some light on demands of Iranian people and the path towards democratization in Iran, 
and may contribute to theory development and possible future policy formation.  
           I will test the four independent variables to examine whether they can account and 
explain for the dependent variable. Using general process tracing to account for causal 
chains along with the congruence method, I will work to ensure that the within-case study 
suffices for examining the dependent variable. This is important because the Green 
Movement is a relatively new phenomenon and needs to be examined separate from older 
versions of social movements in order to establish its identity. The interaction between 
the three approaches (political opportunities structure, resource mobilization, and framing 
processes) will be considered constant in this study to avoid issues of spuriousness, 
causal priority, and causal depth in judging the strength of inferences made on the basis 
of congruence tests.  
           The data for this study will mainly be collected from statements and sources on the 
Internet, such as opposition websites, international news agencies, social media websites, 
and blogs of the opposition activists during the protests. As many of these web pages and 
some of the Iranian scholars and opposition activist’s commentaries on the 2009 protests 
are in Farsi, the author’s translation will be added to this research wherever these works 
are cited. Also, some Twitter feeds and Facebook and Youtube updates during the 
protests, as well as Short message Service (SMS) messages will be used to indicate the 
extensive use of ICTs during the collective action. The so-called leaders’ statements and 
presidential campaign debates on state media before the elections will also be analyzed. 
The Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies 
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website7 will also be assessed to reveal the extent to which people are connected and use 
the internet and mobile phone services in Iran.   
         Some of the Farsi websites and blogs include: Advarnews, Kaleme (“word”), 
Jonbeshe Rahe Sabz (Jaras) (“the movement of green path”), Jomhourikhahi 
(“republicanism”), Balatarin (the hottest link), Roozonline, BBC Persian, VOA Persian, 
Deutsche Welle Persian, Radiofarda, the Green Movement’s of Iran Video Blog, 
Tahavole Sabz (“the green change”), Green Correspondents, Shahrvand-khabarnegre 
Sabz (“green citizen-journalists”), Nedaye Sabze Azadi (“green voice for freedom”), Zan-
Nevesht (“woman-writings”), Tan-Nevesht (“body-writings”).8  
          The literature on social movements identifies interacting patterns of structures, 
resources and values and meanings. Having identified the most relevant factors of each of 
these categories to the Green Movement in this chapter, this research will conduct in 
depth analysis on four of the independent variables that mainly pertain to cultural and 
framing processes. Chapter Two will investigate the Green Movement adherents’ 
identities with an eye on their use of ICTs. Chapter Three explores the statements and 
activities of the Green Movement well-known figures during the height of the protests. In 
Chapter four, I will try to investigate the interaction between the structure, mobilization, 
and framing as these processes constantly interact.  Due to the novelty of this 
phenomenon there is little access to archival works. The scholarly works on 1999 student 
protests will also be examined in order to establish a historical causal mechanism for 
variables examined.  
 
                                                
7	  http://www.ict.gov.ir/home-­‐en.html	  	  
8	  A	  list	  of	  all	  Farsi	  websites	  and	  blogs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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CHAPTER II:  
GRASSROOTS’ IDENTITIES AND USE OF INFORMATION 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
            In order to comprehensively understand a social movement we need to understand 
the social structures that inform its actions at both national and international levels. It is 
also wise to look at the protest through socio-historical lenses, in terms of ongoing 
changes in the economic, social, and cultural fields. If social structures and cultural 
frames are, as Calhoun states, inseparable, it seems that it supports a crossover between 
structure and agency.   
             Most of the decisions in life are made by using the available information. The 
role of the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) thus becomes particularly 
important. Most of the scholarship on the role of ICTs in the organizing and framing of 
social movements is on open and in many cases western democracies, in which the role 
played by the traditional mass media (i.e., television, radio, newspapers) and the new 
media have both influenced the emergence and form of a particular social movement. In 
the case of the Green Movement and in closed authoritarian states, with limited access to 
the traditional media, the role of the new media and especially the Internet becomes more 
important. This chapter on the cultural structure of the grassroots and their informal 
social networks will examine the impact of the Internet in the emergence, organization, 
and development of the Green Movement as many journalists and individuals turned to 
the Internet as means to make their voices heard. This type of activity made bottom-up 
communication possible, which was started long before the Green Movement emerged. 
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           With a focus on the Internet use and the Iranian Blogistan, this chapter will first 
establish the cultural context in which the Green Movement emerged. Second, I will 
process trace the ICTs use during the 2009 presidential election campaign and the Green 
Movement to figure out whether there are any congruities with this thesis’ hypotheses on 
the emergence and form of the Green Movement, and in framing a collective identity 
among the protesters. Then, I will discuss the implications of the ICTs use for the Green 
Movement in particular, and social movements in general. A brief literature on how 
collective identities are formed in situations such as social movements where high 
emotions are involved is first necessary.  
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORIES  
Two dominant theoretical perspectives explain the framing of a collective 
identity: the relative deprivation theory, and social identity theory (Zomeren, 2009). 
Relative deprivation theory (RDT), posits that only when individuals perceive their 
situation as relatively deprived will they experience anger and resentment, and seek to 
improve their situation. This requires at least two conditions for individuals to engage in 
a collective action. First, the deprivation must be perceived as group based. A second 
insight from RDT suggests that individuals do not simply perceive social injustice or 
inequality, but are often emotionally aroused by it too. This idea has paved the way for 
applications of group-based emotion to the study of collective action. For instance, 
feelings of group based anger and resentment motivate individuals’ willingness to engage 
in collective action. 
          Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) proposes that 
individuals’ perceptions of socio-structural characteristics influence their identification 
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with the group, which predicts the likelihood of their participation in collective actions. 
First, group members should perceive the boundary between their (low-status) group and 
the comparison (high-status) group to be impermeable, such that they cannot join the 
high-status group and improve their individual position. This is parallel with RDT’s 
distinction between group and individual deprivation. Second, the group’s low-status 
position should be perceived as illegitimate or undeserved. This means that people should 
be able to imagine alternatives to the status quo (Tajfel, 1978). Third, the inequality 
should be perceived as unstable, reflecting a sense of agency that the social structure can 
be changed. In this way, individuals’ group-based perceptions of, and emotional 
responses to, inequality and injustice have been identified as important predictors of their 
willingness to engage in collective action. This aspect, as well as participation in a 
collective action, promote a sense of psychological empowerment among group 
members.   
            Others have argued, however, that perceptions of, and even emotions based in, 
relative deprivation and illegitimacy may not be enough to predict actual collective action 
behavior. Building on SIT, they propose that a strongly developed and politicized sense 
of identification with a social movement is the best predictor of such behavior (Simon 
and Klandermans, 2001).  Some authors have taken this argument even further to contend 
that people primarily identify with social groups for the purpose of mobilizing for 
collective action and social change. Thus, another important factor motivating collective 
action is individuals’ politicized identification with their group. Other scholars have 
argued that not only in-group perceptions and emotions matter, but also individuals tend 
to engage in cost-benefit calculation to determine whether they have the proper resources 
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to mobilize for collective action (McCarthy, McAdam, Zald, 1996). The implication of 
such theories and how the ICTs have enforced types of emotional collective identity 
framings will be discussed in the third part of this chapter. 
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT: BOTTOM-UP INTERNET USE AND 
BLOGGING 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
           In 1998, when the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami was elected president 
with a landslide victory, Internet use was limited to those with computer engineering 
skills and the knowledge of a second language. Farsi content on the web was limited, and 
only a few governmental organizations and newspapers shared a portion of their 
information on the Internet. After almost eight years of Khatami’s presidency the number 
of Internet users in 2005 surpassed 4.5 million.9 Almost all the governmental and non-
governmental institutions and newspapers had their own websites. The news content 
published in the newspapers became accessible on the Internet and many governmental or 
non-governmental news agencies began to disseminate the latest news on the web. 
Individuals also began to write weblogs. University students were the originators of 
blogging in Iran in 2001 (Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010). 
            By the end of Khatami’s first term presidency of four years, the reformist 
newspapers were banned and many closed. With Internet use becoming more widespread, 
reformists began to use it as a means to publish the news, debate issues, and critique the 
regime. Development of different news networks on the web which had the same content 
                                                
9Telecommunications	  Company	  of	  Iran.	  (2009).	  [Graph	  illustration	  of	  ICT	  use	  during	  2006-­‐2009	  in	  Iran.]	  
Iran	  Telecommunications	  Statistical	  Indexes-­‐	  September2009.	  	  Available	  from	  
http://tci.ir/s40/p_1.aspx?lang=En	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as the banned newspapers and opposition news websites based outside of Iran, caused the 
state to limit and control access to these websites. Later individual weblogs added to the 
challenge, with the state unable to control all of them. These websites and blogs 
surpassed the regime’s control over news dissemination and began to debate and 
challenge the state’s policies by establishing channels to make different voices heard.   
           This was the first time since the establishment of the Islamic Republic that a 
majority of grassroots and not the elites could debate, criticize, and disseminate the 
information on state policies and actions. In response, the regime started banning and 
filtering some of these websites viewed as contradictory to Islamic values (especially any 
deemed political). Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) warned 
Internet provider companies to obtain legal licensing. With the government having the 
Internet service providers’ (ISPs) property rights under its control, Internet providers 
were obliged to prevent the spread of non-Islamic, political, and ‘un-lawful parties’ on 
the web. Thus, observing Internet content was defined as one of the Supreme Council of 
Cultural Revolution’s responsibilities, and filtering websites and un-lawful content 
became government’s responsibility. The Supreme Council announced that it was 
protecting Islamic and national values by observing Internet content and banning and 
filtering websites. In the last months of Khatami’s presidency, these acts proved to be 
controversial among many union organizations and individuals. But Khatami defended 
the supreme council’s decision and declared that the council is trying to defend the 
national culture and values by doing so.10 
                                                
10Omidvar,	  Kaveh.	  (2005,	  August).	  Internet	  During	  Eight	  Years	  of	  Reformist	  Government.	  BBC	  News.	  
(translation	  by	  the	  author).	  Retrieved	  from	  :	  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/08/050810_pm-­‐ka-­‐internet-­‐khatami.shtml	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The case was the same for cell phone users and services such as Short Message 
Service (SMS) and Multi-Media Messaging Service (MMS). As mobile telephony swept 
across Iran, people found many intriguing uses for them. Iranians use SMS daily to send 
out jokes (political or not) as well as organizational and informational messages. In April 
2007, Iran’s telecommunication ministry announced that it would start filtering ‘immoral’ 
video and audio messages sent via mobile phones. The ministry was instructed by the 
Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution to buy the equipment needed to prevent any 
misuse of MMS.11 Yet in the autumn of 2008, one could travel underground, open up a 
Bluetooth and receive a welter of explicit adult or even political material and jokes on a 
mobile phone.  
  Censorship and control in the late Khatami presidency and Ahmadinejad’s first 
term, drove many people, including publishers, writers, journalists, and ordinary readers 
to the Internet to find and to provide information, and to debate and make space for 
expression. The journalist union came under severe attack in June 2008 when, as part of 
the general incursion on civil liberties and social movement activities, the Iranian 
government threatened to dissolve the their association12 and tried to remove the 
association’s executive committee to replace them with conservative journalists. Some 
created web based publications or collectives of writers who behaved much like a 
pressroom, and yet others clustered in halghe (circles) of individual bloggers. Sreberny 
and Khiabany note that these individuals are most often unpaid, often anonymous, and 
self-organizing, and that these types of publications rapidly replaced the banned titles of 
                                                
11Iran	  to	  Filter	  ‘Immoral’	  Mobile	  Messages.	  (2007,	  April).	  Reuters.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSDAH83913820070428	  
12	  Attacks	  on	  the	  Press	  in	  2008:	  Iran.	  (2008).	  Committee	  to	  Protect	  Journalists.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://www.cpj.org/2009/02/attacks-­‐on-­‐the-­‐press-­‐in-­‐2008-­‐iran.php	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formal journalism. In this dynamic, many journalists became bloggers, and other bloggers 
have become journalists, especially outside Iran. Many of the once active bloggers from 
inside Iran are now employed by Persian news services outside Iran, or write in well-
known international journals. 
           Control produces resistance. To surpass the regime’s control over the Internet (the 
news content and the blogs) many have turned to hacking and filter-shekan (anti-proxy) 
(Sreberny and Khiabany, 82). Many users of the Internet in Iran use these anti-proxies or 
literally filter-breakers to go around government control. Many individuals as well as the 
Persian language websites such as BBC Persian and VOA Persian, based outside of Iran 
are actively involved in creating new anti-proxies and sending them out to Iran. People 
discuss uses and different versions of these anti-proxies on different websites such as 
Balatarin (the hottest link), a website that ranks the most popular link of the day for 
Iranians.  
By 2008 more sophisticated tools were available, produced by university 
graduates inside Iran. There were programs for Firefox that enabled users to circumvent 
the filter that blocked access to Flicker, the photo sharing website. Another extension 
turned Firefox itself into a proxy that bypassed censorship on popular Web 2.0 websites 
such as Youtube, Flicker, Myspace, and many others that were barred in Iran. Within less 
than one hour of the BBC World Service website being blocked in January 2006, one was 
offered ways into the site by people, and not all young, eager to be helpful (Sreberny and 
Khiabany, 2010). Such techniques have been the terrain of fairly sophisticated net users; 
in the summer of 2009 they were even more widely circulated and publicized, with 
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numerous Youtube videos and Facebook and Twitter posts explaining how to circumvent 
net censorship and how to become a citizen journalist.  
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT  
             Hamid Dabashi (2010) argues “cyberspace has expanded the cosmopolitan 
worldliness of Iranian culture, further intensifying its multiple contentiousness as a 
guarantor of resistance to any mode of governmentality that comes its face” (p.120). But 
as Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) indicate, not all the sites or blogs in the blogosphere 
engage with politics, rather they share the view with Dabashi that even “the most 
mundane of issues in the Islamic Republic comes to have a gendered and political twist” 
(p.129). In the blogosphere, a wide range of organizations and individuals are debating 
the most significant and the most mundane of topics that are related to gendered relations 
and state policies that affect Iranian women. Central to Dabashi’s argument of the 
formation of this social phenomenon, for example, has been the rise of what bloggers call 
tan-neveshteha (“body-writings”), a sustained and proactive flow of prose that young 
women bloggers, in particular, have been writing about their own bodily (erotic) 
experiences. Related to these tan-neveshteha has been del-neveshteha (“heart-writings”), 
writing about one’s love and affection, again practiced mostly by young women. 
           Attempts to ‘Islamicise’ Iranian society after the 1979 revolution have been met 
with many obstacles. The rapid modernization of Iran, the increase in urbanization, 
literacy, and access to education, the connectivity as well as the inherent contradictions in 
the Iranian state policies, which from one side encourages women to participate in the 
public sphere and from the other deprives them of their many basic rights, have led to a 
wider participation of women in the public sphere and new forms of politics. The very 
	   44	  
‘traditionalist’ women who were assigned to implement and safeguard the state policies 
in Iran (one good example of them is Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard) have also begun 
to challenge the discriminatory policies of the state and conservative readings of Islam. 
Dabashi believes that in the course of the Green Movement we have seen the 
“retrieval” of Iranian cosmopolitanism, which has been the essence of the 1979 
revolution hijacked by a few Islamic fanatics who have tried to silence it for more than 
three decades. He takes the Iranian, Islamic, and Christian calendars that are relevant in 
everyday lives of Iranians as an indication of this cosmopolitanism. Pointing to the 1979 
course of revolutionary events, he argues the Islamic rituals of 1978 were the most 
influential determinants of the success of the revolution in overthrowing the Pahlavi 
regime. More than 17 million people marched the streets of the capital Tehran in Ashura 
(one of the most important dates in the Shi’it and Islamic calendar) to demand the 
departure of the Shah. He points to the fact that in the aftermath of the Green Movement 
people have used the Persian New Year festivities as a tool to insist on their Iranian 
identity; one thing that could be seen on the weblogs of the Green Movement activists 
which are full of nationalist discussions. The creative combination of these planes offers 
opportunities to “play with and subvert the stratagems that a garrison state may wish to 
deploy.” Islam according to Dabashi is “integral” to this cosmopolitanism but not 
“definitive” of it—as it is “secularism.” He argues that the “multiple consciousness,” 
imbedded in this use of three calendars is the space where the creative subject could 
always find room for “political defiance, social maneuverability, and national identity” 
(p.206).  
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The signs of this culture, for Dabashi, are prose and poetry; the love letters of two 
women activists to their husbands who have been imprisoned in the aftermath of the 
Green Movement, expressed both as a personal affection and the demonstration of a 
social phenomena. And beyond poetry the signs are clear in the popular music scene with 
women pop singers publicly expressing their affection for a male object of desire. He 
argues that the defiant prose of the bloggers (young women in particular) has been chiefly 
responsible for this public and open expression of love.  In Iran according to Dabashi 
(2010) “things have moved beyond the false and falsifying binary of modernity/tradition” 
(p.203). Against the gain of the militant Islamism he argues, the body has not become 
political. The love letters of wives of the imprisoned opposition figures and journalists, 
are an indication of a healthy retrieval of the social body that has naturally grown in the 
body politic of a nation, “the public fusion of the political and the erotic is the defining 
moment of this resurgent social body as it retrieves and defines its emancipated 
cosmopolitan disposition” (p.188). A culture all but destroyed by the Islamic Republic. 
For him, the Green Movement marks the return of such culture.  
            This cosmopolitanism, according to Bayat (2009), refers to both a social condition 
and an ethical project. The former signifies certain objective processes, such as 
globalization, migration, and traveling that compel people of diverse communal, national, 
or radical affiliations to associate, work, and live together. These processes lead to 
diminishing cultural homogeneity in favor of diversity, variety, and plurality of cultures, 
religions, and lifestyles.  
Cosmopolitanism also has ethical and normative dimensions; it is a project with 
humanistic objectives (Bayat, 2009). In this sense, cosmopolitanism is deployed to 
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challenge the language of separation and antagonism, and to confront cultural superiority 
and ethnocentrism. It further stands opposed to communalism, where the inward-looking 
and close-knit ethnic or religious collectives espouse narrow, exclusive, and selfish 
interests. Cosmopolitanism of this sort also overrides the “multiculturalist” paradigm. 
Because although multiculturalism calls for equal coexistence of different cultures within 
a national society, it is still preoccupied with cultural boundaries and outlook that departs 
from a cosmopolitan world where intense interaction, mixing, and sharing tend to blur 
communal boundaries, generating hybrid and “impure” cultural practices.  
Another example of such social phenomena, which has intensified during thirty 
years of the Islamic Republic’s project of ‘Islamicising’ Iran, is a politically satiric TV 
show on Voice of America’s (VOA) Persian channel. Hosted by two young Iranian ex-
patriots, blending Iran’s traditional music with the western style music, and comparing 
Iran’s politics to the democratic states and making fun of it, it starts with these opening 
phrases in satire: “a TV show from the children of the revolution, who are now 
considered the mercenaries of the US in order to spread arrogance in our Islamic 
country.” Their Facebook page receives more than 30,000,000 hits every month.13 One of 
their fans on Facebook lost his life on the streets of Tehran during the recent Green 
Movement protests in support of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.  
  Other voices actively blogging on the blogosphere include leftists, unionists, and 
students. It is worth noting that more than 40 million of Iranians, about 70 percent of the 
population, are under the age of 30, while nearly 50 percent are under 20. The student 
uprising in the summer of 1999 demonstrated the importance of this young generation of 
                                                
13Hosseini,	  K.,	  Arbabi,S	  .	  (2010,	  May	  20).	  Parazit	  6.	  VOA	  Persian.	  Washington	  D.C.	  Available	  from	  
http://www.facebook.com/parazitparazit	  
	   47	  
students. In analysis of 1999 student uprisings Mahdi (1999), suggests that the absence of 
anti-imperialism and anti-American sentiments was matched by the absence of reference 
to socialism, Marxism, and capitalism. However in recent years the students, at least 
sections of them, have been radicalized. The failure of the reform movement to achieve 
any key aims such as the rule of law, accountability, and more social openness, the 
election of Ahmadinejad and his radical rhetoric and practices, and the changing 
environment in the region (the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and threat of a military 
attack on Iran) have produced a different kind of response. According to Mahdi the 
student movement in Iran cannot and should not be generalized.  
           The Diaspora has also been active in the blogosphere, as many second and third 
generations of Iranians are now living outside Iran and have children. The blogs have 
been a good tool of connecting these individuals to inside Iran and widening their circles 
of friends in social media networks.  
Blogging as an activity plays powerfully on the cusp of the public-private: private 
matters are turned public; public affairs are translated and coded for private, 
known readers. Circles are built up of other bloggers, commentary upon 
commentary, because bloggers are amongst each others, most faithful readers and 
so new friendships are formed (Srenebry and Khiabany, 2010, p.160). 
  
           Sreberny and Khiabany (2010) also argue that if journalism is about articulating 
social and political issues, about investigation and analysis, then “the Iranian blogosphere 
functions as a powerful alternative, free at the point of consumption and relatively free at 
the point of production-if the mighty hand of the state can be avoided.” Given this 
background the explosion of journalism and photojournalism during the election process 
of June 2009 and after can be seen as no surprise. “Here was a cadre of talented, 
frustrated professionals and non-professionals prevented from doing their job and having 
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a voice. Little wonder that so many people had so much to say in 2009” (p.126). Noting 
this social phenomena and its diverse and vast demonstrations on the Internet, especially 
the social media and the blogs, Sreberny and Khiabany note there is no surprise that these 
individuals seeing themselves unable to change the course by casting their votes, “felt 
frustrated in the election of 2009 and produced such an instant social movement. It had 
been brewing for years” (p.129). 
THE STATE CATCHING UP WITH GRASSROOTS’ INTERNET USE  
           The widespread use of Internet and high levels of connectivity in Iran have 
convinced some elements of the regime and clerics that they have to catch up with the 
latest technologies in order to reach out to the public. The Internet was used in 2005 
election campaigns as well (Sreberny, Khiabany, 2010, p.141). With all candidates 
having their own websites/blogs, and many religious institutions and agencies had 
deemed it necessary to establish an on-line presence. The difference, however, was that 
the debate and the consensus framing on many informal social networks and blogs and 
among individuals was not to participate in the elections. The failed promises of Khatami 
in the eight years of his presidency and the absence of any strong candidate who would 
bring a change in state policies had convinced many to boycott the election in order to not 
give the regime the legitimacy it needed.  
             In addition to the blogging activities of the inner circle of the state closely 
associated with the veleyat-e-faghih (“the rule of the jurist”)—a reference to Iran’s 
supreme leader—there are many religious intellectuals who, while still committed to an 
Iranian state, have in recent years distanced themselves from its theological structure. 
Many of these were part of the reformist camp that came to force during Khatami’s two 
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terms as president (1997-2001 and 2001-2005). One of these figures is Mohammad Ali 
Abtahi, one of Iran’s six vice presidents during Khatami’s presidency, who launched his 
blog in September 2003, which became an instant hit. He announced his opening of a 
blog as “I am here as well!” Shortlisted for Deutsche Welle International Weblog award 
in 2006, his blogs consisted of daily articles and diaries, extensive archives, and articles 
about him in other media. He wrote commentary in Persian and English on cultural and 
social issues and regularly criticized any crack down on weblogs and the Internet. As one 
of the chief advisors to one of the election candidates and later the opposition figure, 
Mehdi Karoubi, Abtahi was arrested on June 2009 during the aftermath of the 
presidential election, appeared in a show trial, and was sentenced to six years in prison.14 
SUMMER OF 2009 AND THE ELECTIONS  
THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
             A look at Blogistan in both 2005 and 2009 presidential elections makes it clear 
that the consensus languages among bloggers in these two presidential elections were 
completely different.  In 2005, it was the first time that Farsi language weblogs had a 
chance to debate the presidential candidates and challenge other activists’ opinion. In an 
analysis of Persian Blogistan in the weeks leading to the 2005 presidential elections, BBC 
Persian’s website reported that from the first day of the election campaign many 
influential figures in Blogistan were speaking of boycotting the elections. These 
individuals are disappointed with Khatami’s eight years of reform government that has 
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brought no real change in the Islamic Republic’s system and has not been able to fulfill 
its promises of a more open society and or even create jobs and control inflation.15 
            The reasoning of those who have decided to boycott the elections in 2005 was that 
the president does not have any operative authority in Iran and the other vertical 
institutions make it a weak authority. Others did not want to give the Islamic Republic the 
legitimacy it needs in the international arena by taking part in the elections. One of the 
most famous figures boycotting the 2005 elections was Akbar Ganji (an insider and later 
a political prisoner of the Islamic Republic), whose decision on not taking part in the 
2005 presidential elections influenced many on Blogistan. Also, more than 550 elites and 
political figures boycotted the elections (even before the Guardian Council rejected the 
competency of many individuals to announce their candidacy) because of the monopoly 
of power, and the fact that they could not see any hopes of the situation getting better by 
participating in the elections.  
           There were, however, voices that were skeptical of boycotting the elections in 
2005. One of the most prominent figures was Abtahi, who writes,  
no analyst is hopeful of a sudden regime change in Iran, with its vast oil resources 
and powerful army. We have a duty in this situation to think about the youth of 
Iran and those who don’t want to leave the country and have very fragile 
situation. Boycotting the elections, and the victory of one of the hardliner 
candidates will have a direct impact on the youth’s everyday lives. They won’t be 
able to walk in the streets the way they want, write weblogs, and not go to jail for 
that.16 
 
In 2009, however, the situation was different. The state, having controlled most 
media and power resources, adopted a strategy to allow the opposition to organize its 
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campaigns freely. The strategy purported to motivate people to vote in the election. For 
the first time since the 1979 revolution, there were heated TV debates on the State-owned 
TV channels between the presidential candidates.17 This was an exceptional opportunity 
given to the political reformists and probably the only time available to broadcast their 
messages in public without censorship. The reformists’ pre-election campaigns drew 
unexpected support, as they allowed hope for change. Mass rallies supporting the 
opposition occurred nationwide throughout the campaign period.  
          During the 2009 presidential elections, the Blogistan was buzzing with invitations, 
writings, and hope to go out and vote to change the course that Ahmadinejad had 
followed during his first four years of presidency. Ahmadinejad’s government policies 
(both domestic and international) in his first four years as president, which had further 
isolated Iran, had a strong impact on people’s decision to go out and vote. Almost all the 
weblogs were trying to encourage Iranians to vote; few were arguing in favor of a 
boycott.  
            In an interview with the BBC Persian website, Dariush Malakoot, the author of 
the weblog Malakoot, notes that every blogger has a circle of friends, fans, and family 
who are the ones influenced indirectly by the weblogs contents. This means that the 
bloggers can transfer the debates and information sharing going on the blogs to their 
family and friends and indirectly influence them.18 Akbar Montajebi, who writes a blog 
with the same name, argued that one of the main characteristics of the 2009 elections is 
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the leading argument on the blogs that encourages everyone to take part in the elections. 
In this regard one could read in the blog named Zan-Nevesht (“woman-writings”),  
which way that I look, I can see that in the current situation I am in the margins’ 
of today’s society. For being a woman, and a liberal. And I don’t have any hope 
that this situation changes anytime soon. I will vote in the elections, so that I can 
claim my marginalized right, and to make my voice heard to an extent and be 
active.19 
  
Also, in the debates about whether to vote or not, in the Blogistan many believed that 
boycotting the elections would benefit Ahmadinejad and the hardliners camp. This was 
coupled with the belief among the youth that if there is going to be a change in their lives, 
it is going to happen by participating in the elections. 
           There were debates between the supporters, and even the advisors and 
representatives of each of the four candidates in the Blogistan. Once there was a televised 
debate between two candidates, the wave of critiques and supports from their opponents 
and supporters filled the blogs. Besides, the flow of comments under each post and the 
controversies over one paragraph written in a blog show the public’s enthusiasm and 
conviction to take part in the debate.   
In this intense political debate over the elections on the Internet and the virtual 
world, the publication of a photo showing Mousavi and his wife hand in hand in public 
after leaving a campaign lecture, buzzed the Blogistan and the Internet.20 What was new 
about this photo was the merging of private space to public space—what has been 
controlled and almost forbidden for years in Iran’s media. It may be because of this 
change and difference that many believed Mousavi’s conduct in the campaign was 
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thoughtful and goal oriented, in a way to invoke public enthusiasm for the elections. Even 
if such conduct was just a campaign gesture, its importance in the Islamic Republic 
cannot be refuted. The flow of comments and reaction to this picture, in the context of 
Islamic Republic’s control over citizen’s private lives, show that every non-political act 
can become political and cause controversy in Iran today.  
           State control over people’s everyday lives, from sports to arts, has made the public 
look at everything in terms of state policies that restrict their lives. This has resulted in 
interpreting and relating any simple private or individual conduct to the political 
framework reigning on the country. In these circumstances, the conduct of the youth or 
even the way they dress becomes a political act, even if such goal may have never 
crossed a youth’s mind. A simple picture of a candidate and his wife creates controversy 
in a way that someone wrote in a weblog: “I am extremely excited.” Another blogger 
took it even more seriously and wrote: “this picture tells the biggest story in three 
decades of Iranian politics. The moment when love is formally recognized.”21 
In a demonstration of mobilizing for women rights, Mousavi’s wife, Zahra 
Rahnavard, appeared in an election campaign video clip along with one of Iran’s well 
known and respected actresses and a former woman minister to highlight her husband’s 
plans for defending women’s rights. The state’s policies and conservative laws against 
women were strongly criticized in that video clip. This was also the first time after the 
1979 revolution that a candidate’s wife was campaigning for elections alongside her 
husband. The videos of Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard visiting different cities for 
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election campaign were flouting on social networking websites and Youtube, adding to 
the excitement of the youth to participate in the elections.  
           A study of Iran’s blogosphere on election eve finds that Mousavi had broader 
support in the online blog community than Ahmadinejad.22 The study suggests that there 
has been as interesting contrast between Ahmadinejad’s emtedadmehr.com website, 
whose links are very concentrated in the Conservative Politics cluster, and 
Mousavi’s mirhussein.com webpage, whose links are from all over the map, not just the 
reformist politics group. The study also finds a vast number of links coming out from the 
poetry cluster, which rarely links to political sites. Also, Mousavi has even more links 
from the CyberShi’a than Ahmadinejad. The study affirms that “this online interest 
doesn’t necessarily translate to the offline world, but it may indicate a broader level of 
excitement about Mousavi in the electorate, particularly among those outside his 
expected base of supporters, which could ultimately lead to higher voter turnout for 
Mousavi” (Kelly and Etling, 2009).  
              In an interview with the Aljazeera English during the election campaign, one of 
Mousavi’s campaign advisors indicated the importance of Internet and social media for 
the campaign, as the reformists were skeptical of state media policies that they believed 
were mostly in favor of Ahmadinejad. For us, Saeed Shariati says, “the Internet is like the 
air force in a military campaign. It bombards the enemy’s positions and lays the 
groundwork for the infantry,our volunteers, so that they can win battles on the ground.”23 
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Many of Mousavi’s election rallies where organized on Facebook, such as the 25 
kilometer human chain of his support.24 
             The use of Youtube for the campaign was also unprecedented. Many young 
Iranians used the video-sharing website in creative ways to get their message crossed. 
One video showed Iranians in Tehran and different countries around the world with 
banners that read “I will vote,” as part of the campaign by the supporters of Mousavi and 
Karoubi to encourage as many people to vote.25  As the journalist and blogger Hamid 
Tehrani notes, the Youtube videos were also used for fact checking. During the campaign 
Mousavi and many other activists from the reform camp accused Ahmadinejad of lying 
to the nation and basing state policies on superstitions. Ahmadinejad denied, during a 
televised debate with one of his reformist candidates that he ever claimed a “halo” 
surrounded him during a United Nations (UN) address in 2005. A video clip on YouTube 
shows that Ahmadinejad did in fact say that a light enveloped him during his address to 
the UN General Assembly and that the crowd stared without blinking during the entire 
speech,26 shaming the incumbent. Candidates and their supporters also took advantage of 
Youtube to publish their campaign videos. Many well-known figures of Iranian film 
industry, including Majid Majidi, Dariush Mehrjoee, Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, and 
Mohsen Makhmalbaf, supported the reformists and participated in or produced video 
campaigns for Mousavi and Karoubi. 
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THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE ICTS 
 
         According to Iran’s Telecommunication Statistical Indexes, mobile subscriber 
activation had reached 32,292,513 by September 2009 and mobile subscriber penetration 
rates were 44% of the population. The same data indicates that national Internet users had 
reached 23,000,000 in 2009 compared to only 8,800,000 in 2006. A little less than half of 
Iran’s population are using mobile phones in their day-to-day lives, nearly a quarter of 
them are connected to the Internet. The images and videos of their demonstrations in the 
aftermath of the 2009 disputed elections were brought to the world’s attention through 
the social media and video sharing websites such as Youtube. 
           On Friday, June 12, 2009, enthusiastic crowds turned to the voting stations to cast 
their votes, many polling stations had to remain open longer than planned due to long 
queues. Within two hours of the polls closing the vote was announced: 62.6 percent for 
Ahmadinejad.27 The reported vote remained constant for all subsequent areas of the 
country. This rapid declaration of a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad was immediately 
rejected by the other three candidates, including the second conservative candidate, 
Rezaii. The reformist camp questioned the outcome for the speed of the declaration, for 
the actual figures given (which remained constant), and for the lack of variation by region 
in Iran (Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010, p.172).   
          Mousavi who at least was hopeful for a second round, insisted he was the victor 
and appealed against the result to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader. In a 
letter he rejected the results: “I personally strongly protest the many obvious violations 
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and I'm warning I will not surrender to this dangerous charade,” and emphasized that, 
“the result will jeopardize the pillars of the Islamic republic and establish tyranny.”28 
          Quickly the slogan of a ‘stolen election’ spread and ‘where is my vote?’ became a 
national outcry of many Iranians who believed that their votes were ignored. Hundreds of 
demonstrators wearing Mousavi's signature green color marched down Vali-Asr Avenue 
demanding all Iranians to support them and shouting slogans such as  “Mousavi, give us 
our votes back,” and “the election was full of lies,” before being dispersed.29 Within an 
hour, first video of the demonstrations emerged on Youtube and quickly was shared on 
social networking websites. 
            In an effort to avoid any calls for vote cancelation and recount, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, in a statement issued on state television on Saturday afternoon, congratulated 
Ahmadinejad on his victory and pointedly urged the other candidates to support him.30  
Later, in a televised address on Saturday night, Ahmadinejad called on the public to 
respect the results, and he denounced foreign diplomatic and journalistic criticism. “All 
political and propaganda machines abroad and sections inside the country have been 
mobilized against the nation,” he declared.31  However, seeing the pressure and the public 
anger over the result, the Supreme Leader on Monday, June 15, ruled a partial recount of 
the votes, that he had endorsed earlier, and appealed to the nation to remain calm.32  
These efforts to calm the protests and bring back the situation to normal were not 
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effective. Defying the interim ministry’s ban of any gatherings and demonstrations, 
people took to the streets in numbers.  
          Over the next few days the crowds got bigger. During the week of June 15-18 
Tehran witnessed the biggest demonstrations in 30 years, as over a million people 
marched in the city and the demonstrations ended at nights in violent clashes between the 
government militia and the peaceful demonstrators, who showed their non-violent 
intentions in the rally of silence of June 17.33  On June 18, Mousavi called on his 
supporters to rally and promised to attend the rally himself.  According to a report by The 
New York Times34 the silent rally was a deliberate and striking contrast to the chaos of the 
past few days, when riot police officers sprayed tear gas and wielded clubs to disperse 
scattered bands of angry and frightened young people. When the occasional shout or 
chant went up, the crowd quickly hushed it, and some held up signs demonstrating the 
word “silence.” The crowds were refusing to invite any retaliation from the security 
forces, and called for a vote recount or annulations.  Protesters were especially enraged 
that Ahmadinejad on Sunday dismissed them as nothing more than soccer fans who had 
just lost a game and as “dirt and dust.” One demonstrator’s Twitter message read, 
“Ahmadinejad called us dust, we showed him a sandstorm.”35 
           Despite a warning from the Supreme Leader during Friday’s prayers of June 19, 
about the harsh consequences of continuing to protest,36 movement adherents were 
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defiant. They turned out to the streets on June 20, in massive numbers. The day marks the 
death of Neda, whose death was captured on mobile phones, and was published hours 
later on Youtube and was shared through other social networking websites and buzzed 
the Internet. The video received incredible attention and evoked widespread sympathy 
throughout the world.37 Barack Obama described it as heartbreaking, Oxford University 
established a new scholarship in her name, and a street in Rome was named Neda.38 Neda 
soon became both a symbol of the opposition movement and the ruthless nature of the 
regime. On the same day a status update on Mousavi’s official Facebook read “today you 
are the media, it is your duty to report and keep the hope alive.”39 Mousavi’s long-form 
statement to the nation also was not communicated as a release to the press; rather it was 
posted as a note on the candidate’s Facebook page. 
           Some have called the post-election aftermath a ‘Twitter Revolution’ due to the 
astonishing role of social networking sites.40 During the heated moments of the turmoil, 
the US State Department asked Twitter to postpone its planned maintenance to allow 
Iranian protesters to use the service for communicative purposes.41 Google and Facebook 
announced that they would add a Farsi version to their websites in response to 
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widespread use during the protests.42 The critical role of the Internet in the protests was 
recognized by the International Academy of Digital Arts and Sciences as one of the ten 
most influential Internet moments of the decade.43 
             In the days that followed and during the summer of 2009, Many Iranians on 
Facebook changed their avatars to a green square that included the text ‘where is my 
vote?’ While many non-Iranians tweaked the icon to ‘where is their vote?’ Facebook 
turned green.  It became a space for posting video (sometime culled from Youtube), 
articles (culled from the international media and sometimes the Iranian press), 
photographs that had been sent by mobile or e-mail attachment from people in Iran. 
Facebook became an enormous distribution site of new and recycled material.  One could 
watch a new post being picked up and shared almost instantly, seeing it move across 
Facebook. 
            The demonstrators framed their actions around one color, ‘green’, with a ‘stolen 
vote’, as the central message and language of the movement to speak out their grievances. 
The color green became the broadest signifier of the Movement. Green morphed from 
Mousavi’s campaign color during the election to the color for all opposition and 
reformists groups in the post election period. Karoubi’s followers and even people who 
did not vote but were critical of the regime’s brutality against the peaceful protests began 
to use the color. Green soon appeared at public events, football matches, festivals and so 
forth. Although Mousavi had attached religious meaning to this color at the time of the 
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election, by this time it was devoid of religious meaning, so seculars felt comfortable in 
using it to represent their cause. 
            In response, the state intended to cut off all means of communication among the 
public. Most leaders of reformist parties were arrested and demonstrations were declared 
illegal. Overt signs of repression included the failure of phone lines for hours after the 
polls closed and the blocking of the English and Persian-language websites of the BBC 
and Voice of America—which are regularly attacked by the Iranian authorities as 
‘imperialist.’ Text messaging also failed. The regime also put up a website named gerdab 
(“vortex”) that was aimed at intimidating the protesters by putting their pictures on the 
website, threatening them, and asking the public to identify them.44 In response to this, 
the Green Movement came up with its own such website gerdab-e-sabz (“the green 
vertex”), trying to shame the Basij (Islamic Republic’s semi-militia) and the security 
forces by publishing their names and pictures on the website.45 Websites of both sides 
were under continuous cyber-attacks by ‘hacktivists’, which led to temporary disruption 
of the websites.46 
          Protesters used their mobile phones to record the events, including police brutality, 
and then uploaded these images onto the Internet. Hundreds of pictures and videos 
quickly appeared on the Internet and the links were shared on Facebook. Despite the slow 
speed of home Internet connections, people were successful in uploading their videos and 
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photos. The latest news on the protests was therefore available online. This was the only 
way of getting news out of the country, as all foreign news agencies had been forced to 
leave by then.47 
           In the beginning the protests tended to start spontaneously, however, in later 
weeks and months, shared strategies, a collective identity, a loose structure and 
leadership, and visions for the future were gradually fashioned. There was a cycle 
between the streets and the Internet: people planned a demonstration, discussed the 
slogans and strategies on the web, actualized the plans in the streets and confronted the 
security forces, then turned back to the Internet and published the pictures, news and 
videos of the incidents, discussed the outcomes and prepared for the next demonstration.   
          The wide geographical coverage and the amateur quality of the video footage 
indicated that these activities were of an unorganized nature and pointed to individual 
actions taken by individual people (Sohrabi-Haghighat and Mansouri, 2010). The Green 
Movement adopted what Ashraf calls a “hydra approach.”48 Each individual within the 
Green Movement became a leader; “each individual became a “digital node,” which 
made the regime's attempts to squash it desperate.  
           The Green Movement is dependent upon websites, but it is not dependent upon 
any one website. During the height of the protests, activists set up a blog to advertise a 
protest, and when it was taken down, a new blog was put up. The Movement was also 
adept at bringing its online work to bear in the physical world. For example, stencils and 
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flyers were created online and shared throughout the Blogistan, then printed out and used 
during protests. Ashraf notes that during the massive crack downs on the streets and on 
the cyberspace “the Green Movement’s response, basically, has been to create a digital 
movement whose leader is itself, whose central organizing structure is viral, with ebbs 
and flows that adapt to the constantly changing and shifting digital and social landscape 
in post-election Iran.”49 
            The Green Movement effectively employed the Internet to disseminate 
information and to recruit and mobilize people to participate in the protest. Before each 
rally, activists uploaded a great number of posters, video clips and songs on the Internet, 
in an attempt to attract large numbers of people to turn out. Activists proposed many 
slogans, and the main opposition figures issued statements to encourage people to come 
out in support. During these demonstrations, protesters captured eye-catching incidents 
with their mobiles, and sent them via “desktops to television screens” (Bennet, 2003). 
The use of ICT paved the way for many individuals to actively participate and to have 
their voices heard in this era of mass ‘self-communication.’ The Internet and especially 
the social networking websites, first, acted as the main information and organizing 
platform for the protesters and opposition. Second, they created a bridge between Iran 
and abroad. This campaign outside Iran in support of the demonstration could not have 
been possible with the help of many citizen journalists posting their accounts and videos 
of the situation on the ground on the social media.   
            The opposition took the regime’s repression as a key means of attracting global 
media attention and successfully influenced the public agenda. All this was done by 
mobile phones and the Internet in a “micro-to-macro crossover” (Bennet, 2003, p.161). 
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Diffusion of the Green Movement was accelerated incredibly by the Internet, allowing 
for access to Iranian networks all over the world. Pictures and videos of the regime’s 
brutality evoked strong feelings of sympathy throughout the Iranian diaspora. 
Unprecedented solidarity with the protest movement emerged from Iranians abroad and 
several demonstrations were held in support of the Green movement in the US, Canada, 
some European countries, Australia and Asia.50  Iranians abroad called upon their host 
governments not to recognize Ahmadinejad as Iran’s president and to condemn the 
violation of human rights in Iran. In one case, a “green roll” was publicized in Paris. It 
was signed by thousands of Iranians from 167 cities around the world and stated 
“Ahmadinejad is not Iran’s president.”51 All these organizations and networks would 
have been inconceivable without the assistance of ICTs.    
            At first the protests were spontaneously formed to discredit the election, however, 
along the way, the contours of a collective identity appeared. During the election 
campaign, Mousavi’s supporters used a green shadow over their profile pictures on 
Facebook. Sawer (2007) argues that colors influence the ‘emotional life of social 
movements’ and help them to fashion collective identities. Furthermore, a large amount 
of artistic work served to promote an integrated sense of belonging amongst those 
involved in the Movement. An abundance of music, posters and video clips were made 
and published on the Internet by amateurs and was shared among circles of friends and 
activists. The themes were about commemoration of the martyrs and the suffering of their 
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mothers, hopes for a victory and a better future, and the regime’s cruelty; all of which 
served to reinforce the Green Movement’s collective identity (Sohrabi-Haghighat and 
Mansouri, 2010). 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ICT USAGE  
            Laying out the historical, social, and political context on the web and process 
tracing the movement’s adherent activities in their use of ITCs points to indications for 
the role of ICTs in emergence and form of social movements that challenge the state 
power. The importance of such tools in today’s mass communication era can be 
categorized into four types of uses: informational, conversational, symbolic, and 
organizational. 
           The ICTs and mainly, the Internet, provide a space to access information without 
censorship imposed by authoritarian regimes. The Internet is a convenient way for 
information dissemination around the world. ICTs, by connecting activists to other 
adherents, the diaspora, and the main stream media, functions as the main source of 
information. The emotions involved in this kind of information dissemination (seeing a 
citizen dying on the streets) are high and contribute to gathering more adherents and 
sympathizers both inside and outside of a polity for a movement. The ability to use 
technologies to get the information and to interconnect people, rapidly and in real-time 
around the world, made ICTs a valuable tool for activists. 
           Further, Dutton (1999) reminds us that the focus of the information age should not 
be “information”, but “access.” The Internet has changed the rules by taking part in the 
political system. In the same vein, in examination of Iran’s blogosphere three 
interconnected issues should be accounted for: first, a vast number of voices and ideas 
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that find a space to be heard; second, the space that is provided for these individuals and 
organizations to express their views, which can be counted as a form of a resource 
mobilization tool, should we count the individuals as political capitals of one country; 
and third, the range of topics that they introduce into the public sphere, thus surpassing 
the Islamic Republic’s censorship of many social issues and making public previously 
inarticulate and un-noticed social issues, such as gender relations, or political discussions 
(Sreberny and Khiabany,2010). More important than being seen as a solely informational 
tool, the ICTs have provided a space for different and opposite points of views to be 
heard and engage in on-going conversations on different topics. In the case of the Green 
Movement, and in the absence of any formal social movement networks in the real world 
because of the oppression, the Internet has created such space. The conversation and 
debate flourished and at some points outburst both during the election campaign and the 
course of the Green Movement. 
            As a “stolen vote” created a collective identity and was politicized with relative 
deprivation of movement adherents in comparison with the status quo, the symbolic uses 
of ICTs became into play. Seeing social media websites and Youtube as their main 
resource under repression to discuss and enforce their collective identity, movement 
adherents started to frame their actions and discourse by using the ICTs. Almost all the 
demonstrations (such as the “silent protest”) were planned and discussed on the Internet 
(in social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter) and by taking advantage of the 
ICTs. Adherents framed the movement under one color; green, named it at first under a 
“stolen vote,” discussed its strategies through non-violent means, and used the social 
media and Youtube as the main platform for creating images, and uploading videos of the 
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sacrifices in the real time which arises emotions such as shock, fear, anger, and that may 
draw more participants into the movement.  
           The organizational aspect of ICTs with vast connectivity in an environment such 
as Iran also becomes clear by process tracing the adherents’ activities. After each 
demonstration the next steps were discussed and images and videos of the day were 
uploaded. In this sense the ICTs had both their instrumental and symbolic uses. I argue 
that the ICTs were the main platform for Green Movement adherents to discuss, frame, 
and organize their strategies in the face of repression. This can prove true in authoritarian 
states other than the case of the Green Movement, where unlike many open societies the 
Internet is not one way of mass ‘micro-communication’; rather it is the only way.  
           ICTs are one variable in emergence and form of social movements. In the case of 
the Green Movement their informational, conversational, symbolic, and organizational 
function as the main platform for framing and then organizing the movement cannot be 
ignored.  Considering ICTs as another tool, taking up the role of radio, television, and 
cassette tapes during 1970s, to disseminate information and mobilize masses would be 
shortsighted. There are over 70,000 active bloggers in Iran today (Sreberny and 
Khiabany, 2010). The importance of ICTs should be assessed in terms of 
interconnectivity and access and space that they provide for grassroots to explore and 
discuss many social and political topics, bypassing the state’s control. Their role needs to 
be analyzed in the social and cultural context of each movement and with a broader look 
at the space that they provide during years prior to eruption of an emotional and 
revolutionary social movement. In a social movement and under the state’s control, this 
space is the platform for conversation, deliberation, and decision-making. 
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           The fact that many Mousavi and Karoubi supporters—the young and old 
individuals, sometimes without any political affiliations—turned to the Internet as 
activists and volunteers to help the campaign, and later turned to Green Movement 
adherents, is in congruity with the loose structure and non-ideological aspect of the 
movement. Its strategies and organization are mainly discussed on the web (the social 
media and the blogs), between “informal social networks,” which gives everyone a voice. 
It is not dependent upon a central organization or website, and does not follow any 
specific ideology, rather it is dependent on every individual’s creativity and deliberative 
agency that gave the movement its momentum. On one side there were the most powerful 
arms of the Islamic system of government: the Supreme Leader, the military, the 
revolutionary guard, and the Guardian Council. On the other side was a loosely structured 
and diverse coalition that was grown emboldened by the day, with some clerics joining 
Mousavi and Karoubi. But a movement’s success or failure in achieving its goals depends 
on the interplay of other variables in which the political opportunity structure, resource 
mobilization, and framing process constantly interact. This will be discussed in chapter 
four. 
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CHAPTER III:  
OPPOSITION FIGURES AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 
 
INTRODUCTION 
     
A look at Green Movement’s leaders’ biography and political activities reveals 
that they are Islamic Republic system “insiders” and can be considered as founding 
fathers of the regime. This explicit demonstration of the cracks among elites, which was 
indivisibly in place since the early days of revolution in 1979, was a result of 2009 
elections and its aftermath; the Green Movement. Per my proposed methodology, I will 
use process tracing to reveal the role of the two main opposition figures (Mousavi and 
Karoubi) of the movement in emergence and form of the Green Movement. This will also 
help to figure out the congruities with this thesis’ hypotheses.  
           Thus, in this chapter, first I will look at the biography and political activities of 
Mousavi and Karoubi since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Second, I will 
examine their role in the emergence and form of the Green Movement as its so-called 
leaders, through process tracing and concurrence method by taking into account their 
activities and statements in the height of the protests. Third, drawing upon the Green 
Movement’s leadership style and characteristics the implications for resource 
mobilization, framing processes and political opportunity structures will be discussed. 
This allows for theory testing and its expansion to other cases. An introduction to 
leadership in social movements is necessary.  
LEADERSHIP IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
         Morris and Staggenborge (2004) argue that leaders are critical to social movements: 
they inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise 
strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes. They recognize a lacuna in theorizing 
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leadership, as the scholars have failed to fully integrate agency and structure. According 
to them we cannot neglect structure in expense of agency and nor can we ignore agency. 
Further emphasis on the leaders seems to unfairly relegate the critical masses of 
movement to the category of followers (Barker et.al, 2001). Thus, in analyzing the role of 
leadership we need to pay attestation to the political and cultural contexts of the 
movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, movement culture (the framing processes) and 
agency are in a close relationship.  
           There are functional roles played by the leaders at different stages of a movement 
development (Wilson, 1973). Gusfield (1966), as cited by Morris and Staggenborge, 
identifies two roles for a leader; inside of the movement as a “mobilizer,” inspiring 
participants, and outside of the movement as an “articulator,” linking the movement to 
the larger society.  These roles change over time and according to movement 
development. Many draw on Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership, a relational 
approach that assigns a key role to the followers in inputting charisma to leaders. Melucci 
(1996) argues that the Weberian theory of charisma leads to the neglect of social 
relationship between leaders and followers, who are viewed as ceding to a charismatic 
leader and therefore lacking agency.  
Others have explained both the ways in which leaders affect movement 
organization and how movement characteristics shape leadership. Expanding on Weber’s 
relational approach, Wilson (1973) distinguishes among charismatic, ideological, and 
pragmatic types of leaders and their associated types of movement organization. 
Leadership type affects centralization of decision-making, division of labor and the extent 
to which organization is subject to schism. Zald and Ash (Zald and Ash, 1966) point to 
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the ways in which organizational characteristics such as structural requirements for 
membership, affects the demands placed on leaders. An exclusive organization, for 
example, would require its leaders to focus on mobilizing tasks, while an inclusive 
organization would be more likely to have leaders with an articulating style.   
By the same token, leaders from different types of backgrounds shape 
organizational structures in accordance with their previous experiences, influencing the 
mobilization, strategies, and outcome of the movement. Morris and Staggenborge (2004) 
argue that a key theoretical issue is the extent to which the characteristics and actions of 
leaders, as opposed to structural conditions, matter. Different types of leaders come out of 
different organizational structures. Political and cultural context of the movement affects 
leadership. Leaders operate within structures, and they both influence and are influenced 
by movement’s organization and environment. Both structural limitations and 
opportunities for social movements and the ways in which leaders make a difference 
within structural contexts need to be examined. The movement culture is also important 
in analyzing leadership in a social movement.  
BIOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE TWO MAIN 
OPPOSITION FIGURES  
            A brief study of the biography of the two candidates who turned to opposition 
figures in the aftermath of the 2009 elections shows that they held several key posts in the 
Islamic Republic system. These two candidates were also opposition figures during the 
1979 revolution, which overthrow the Pahlavi regime. This explicitly indicates splits 
among officials with leftist, rightist, and fundamentalist affiliations in the Islamic 
republic system that did not surface before in the formation of opposition. Most of the 
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reformists are now considered opposition figures and are in jail. This also can be 
considered as the end of reform era inside the system since it has lost its position inside 
the system and has turned into a form of opposition.  
MIR HOSSEIN MOUSAVI 
            Mousavi has a master’s degree in architecture and urban development from one of 
the most prominent universities of Tehran. He was one of the co-founders of this 
university’s Islamic Council before the revolution. During the 1960s and early 1970s he 
was close to national-religious groups such as the Liberation Front. In the early 1960s he 
married Zahra Rahnavard, a student of sculpture at the time. She was also one of the 
prominent activists who fought the Shah’s regime. In the years leading to Iran’s 
revolution and with Khomeini’s role as the leader of the revolutionary course becoming 
more prominent, Mousavi joined Khomeini’s allies.  
            With the establishment of the Islamic Republic party in the early days after the 
revolution, Mousavi joined, and became its political secretary. He was also the editor in 
chief of a newspaper named Islamic Republic, affiliated with the party. During the 1980s 
he was named the foreign minister. After Rajaii and Bahonar (the time president and 
prime minister) were assassinated in an explosion, Khamenei became the president. His 
first nominee for prime minister did not get enough votes from Iran’s assembly, and 
despite the differences between Khamenei and Mousavi in the Islamic Republic party, 
Khamenei declared Mousavi as the prime minister of the assembly. Many believe that 
this choice was a direct result of Khomeini’s support for Mousavi. Mousavi was Iran’s 
prime minster from that period until after Khomeini’s death in 1989. 
	   73	  
            Differences between Khamenei, who was considered closer to the right wing of 
Islamic revolution, and Mousavi, who was closer to the left wing, continued in their eight 
years of cooperation as president and the prime minister. A split led to Mousavi’s 
resignation after the end of Iran-Iraq war in 1988.The resignation was strongly rejected 
by Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Since almost all of Mousavi’s term as 
prime minister was accompanied by the Iran-Iraq war, he is usually referred to as ‘the 
prime minister of war.’ 
           With the revision of the Iranian Constitution in 1989, the prime minister’s role was 
eliminated. Khomeini’s death meant that Mousavi and the left wing of the Islamic 
Republic lost their principle supporter. Meanwhile, Mousavi left his life as a politician 
and returned to the world of art, where he belonged before the revolution. It is worth 
mentioning that since then, Mousavi has held several marginal posts in the system. In 
1989 he became a member of the Expediency Council, which continued until the 
emergence of the Green Movement. He was also a member of the Supreme Council for 
Cultural Revolution. Mousavi was political advisor to former president, Rafsanjani, 
during eight years of his presidency. During Khatami’s presidency he was also his main 
advisor. The eight years of Khatami’s presidency are known as reform era within the 
system, as many reformists were elected to Majles-e Shora-e Islami (Iran’s Islamic 
Assembly) and occupied several key positions. 
           The main activities pursued by Mousavi during an almost twenty year absence 
from political controversy were academic and artistic. Since the mid 1970s he has been 
teaching in several universities and colleges in Tehran. In 1999, he was chosen as the 
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chair of Iran’s arts academy by then president Khatami and continued his activities with 
that role. Several monuments in Tehran and other cities are the work of his hand.  
MEHDI KAROUBI 
           Mehdi Karoubi, the other presidential candidate in the 2009 elections who joined 
Mousavi in denouncing the election results, is also a well-known figure and an Islamic 
Republic insider. During the revolution he was close to Ayatollah Khomeini and held 
several key posts since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, i.e. the presidency of 
Majles for several terms is one of these key posts. Other key posts include the presidency 
of Bonyad-e Shahid Enghelab-e Islami (Islamic Republic’s Martyrdom Foundation). In 
1991,during the first round of Majles elections after Khomeini’s death, the Guardian 
Council with a new interpretation of law rejected the candidacy of many leftist in a party 
newly established by Karoubi and Khatami and those close to the wing Khat-e Imam 
(“Imam’s Path”). The Islamic Republic’s leftists were almost sidelined from 1991 until 
1997 and the presidency of Mohammad Khatami. 
           In 1997 presidential elections, Karoubi along with other well-known figures of the 
Islamic Republic’s leftists tried to convince Mousavi to declare his candidacy for the 
elections. It was a call that Mousavi rejected. With the election of Khatami as president in 
1997 and a landslide win for reformists in Majles elections, Karoubi returned to power 
again as the president of Majles. During his second term as Majles president, he has been 
close to reformists and has criticized some of Islamic Republic’s polices, but many 
criticize him for compromising freedom of the press by accepting Khamenei’s Hokm-e 
Hokoomati (“State rule”)52 to reject such reform.  
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          By the end of sixth Majles with the presidency of Karoubi, differences between 
him and the reformists were obvious. Not only did he not participate in a sit-in by more 
than one hundred reformists in an attempt to protest against the Guardian Council’s 
rejection of the candidacy of many reformists for next round of Majles, rather he 
announced his objection to the sit-in. He once again declared his candidacy for the Majles 
elections despite the fact that many reformists refused to announce any candidates for the 
seventh Majles elections, which he was not able to enter. During these years he was also 
involved in a financial scandal, which proved controversial within the regime.  
           In 2005, for the first time Mehdi Karoubi announced his candidacy for presidential 
elections. None of the reformist parties including the Majma-e Rohaniyoon-e Mobarez 
(“assembly of combatant clerics”), of which he was the secretary general at the time, 
supported his candidacy. He resigned as a member of the party. In 2005 elections he 
came in third after Ahmadinejad was declared president and Rafsanjani came second. He 
criticized the results and wrote an open letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in 
which he accused Khamenei’s son of supporting one of the candidates. He also declared 
that he would resign from all of his official posts such as the supreme leader’s advisor 
status and membership of the Expediency Council. He stated that he would establish a 
public party, which was inaugurated the same year under the name of Hezb-e Etemad-e 
Melli (“National Trust party”) with Karoubi as its secretary general. A newspaper with 
the same name was also published which was associated with the reformists during 
Ahmadinejad’s first term.53 
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THE GREEN MOVEMENT AND THE OPPOSITION FIGURES  
            In the presidential elections of 1989 and 1993, Rafsanjani was a candidate without 
any strong challengers and by winning the elections he served as president for eight 
years. However, by1997 the politicians of the left wing of the Islamic Republic who were 
trying to find a candidate to fight the conservative camp asked Mousavi to announce his 
candidacy. He did not accept this call, and Mohammad Khatami declared his candidacy. 
After eight years of Khatami’s presidency and a flourishing of debate on reform inside 
the system, the left wing, which was now known as the reformists, went after Mousavi 
again. He rejected a run for presidency, and Ahmadinejad was declared president. It is 
worth to noting that there were also allegations of vote rigging in the 2005 elections, 
namely and the loudest ones from one of the opposition figures in the Green Movement, 
Mehdi Karoubi, who also ran for president in 2005. On the morning of the announcement 
of the election results in 2005, Karoubi rejected the results and famously declared that ‘I 
only slept for a couple of hours at night and in the early morning the results were 
completely changed.’ Analysis of the 2005 elections are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but in the 2009 elections, Karoubi campaigners organized a page on Facebook under the 
title “we are awake this time.”54 
           When the 10th presidential race of the Islamic Republic gained momentum in 
2009, many reformists again turned to Mousavi. He did not reject the call immediately 
and postponed his decision. Meanwhile, Karoubi had declared his candidacy months 
before. In fact he was among the first who declared that he would compete with 
Ahmadinejad in 2009 elections. Despite the fact that none of the main reformist parties, 
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except his own party, supported his candidacy, some of the well-known figures of these 
parties joined his election campaign such as Mohammad Ali Abtahi. His main campaign 
slogan was “change” and he declared himself a guardian of citizens’, women’s, and 
different ethnic minorities’ rights.  
          After months of negotiations among reformists, especially between Khatami and 
Mousavi, Mousavi declared his candidacy and Khatami gave his support to the campaign. 
The details of negotiations between Khatami and Mousavi are not clear, although after a 
few weeks the majority of reformist parties announced their support of Mousavi and 
despite his first statement, his second statement was closer to the reformist language. In 
his campaign he strongly criticized Ahmadinejad’s policies and the unlawfulness of his 
government’s activities. 
          Announcing his candidacy for the presidential race in a televised address to the 
nation, Mousavi declared “I am fighting in this race because I have found the current 
political, economic, and cultural processes worrying.”55  In their campaigns, both 
Karoubi and Mousavi repeatedly targeted Ahmadinejad’s policies and announced that 
they were there to fight against “unlawfulness” and “lying” and that this caused them to 
feel  “danger.” In their televised debate, Mousavi and Karoubi devoted the greatest part 
of their time to criticizing Ahmadinejad instead of debating their own election plans. In 
the debate referring to this unlawfulness and “strange powers” growing out of the 
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government boundaries in the recent years, Karoubi asked Mousavi if he was ready for 
the difficulties and problems ahead.56 
            Declaring himself a reformist, Karoubi asked Mousavi to determine whether he 
considered himself a reformist or a fundamentalist, Mousavi then declared that he was a 
reformist with a reference to the “fundamentals.”57  By that he meant the early years of 
the Islamic Republic (the Imam-Khomeini era) and a return to true Islamic values free of 
corruption. Mousavi and Karoubi have always referred to Islamic values as their principle 
ideology and never rejected the notion of “rule of the jurist” (velayat-e faghih), referred 
to the Supreme Leader, in their statements and speeches both during and after the 
elections. Although they tried to delegitimize the Supreme Leader by writing letters to 
him and seeking to make him use his authority to end the violence against the civilians. 
          This explains what placed these opposition figures at odds with the Green 
Movement at its beginning. The majority of those taking part in the street demonstrations 
were youth with no specific religious ideology. This can be inferred from their slogans 
during the demonstrations (and even from the way they dress); “independence, freedom, 
Iranian republic,”58 instead of “Islamic Republic,” which was one of the main slogans 
during the 1979 revolution. They clearly denounced the Supreme Leader: “Khamenei is a 
murderer, thus his rule is annulled,” or clearly chanting “death to Khamenei” and “death 
to the dictator.” At one point they set a picture of Khamenei on fire.  
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         Whether it was a strategy on the part of Mousavi and Karoubi not to reject the rule 
of the jurist in order to be able to continue their political activities and to frame their 
activities within the framework of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, as well as 
gathering more supporters from diverse backgrounds to the movement, the distinction is 
clear between the majority of the Green Movement adherents and these two figures.  
In his second statement, Mousavi declared, “we as people who believe in Islamic 
Republic and its Constitution, recognize velayat-e-faghih as one the bases of the regime, 
and will follow our political activities within the Constitution’s framework.”59 
Meanwhile he announced that he has asked the Guardian Council for a vote cancellation, 
and referring to article 27 of the same Constitution, he demanded the interior ministry to 
publish a permit for peaceful demonstrations across the country for people to show their 
objections to the election process and the results.  
This has put Mousavi and Karoubi in the role of moral leaders of the Green 
Movement rather than a charismatic leadership with the crowd seen only as followers 
without any agency. They are moral leaders of the movements in terms of trying to cast it 
under a non-violent framework and slow down the revolutionary course that may result in 
violence, and to a lesser extent they are acting as pragmatic leaders in doing so. Also by 
referring to the Constitution and appealing to the Supreme Leader’s authority to end the 
violence against civilians, they further delegitimized the regime, which did not act upon 
its constitution. The implication of this for the Green Movement leadership will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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            In his first statement the day after the election results were announced, Mousavi 
called the results “astonishing”60 and declared that people are watching the elections 
authority’s and the state owned media’s “jugglery” in changing the results. He continued, 
“I declare my harsh objection to this process and the obvious and extensive violations on 
the Election Day, and warn that I will not concur to this dangerous show.”61 He suggested 
that the authorities turn back to the rule of law and Islamic Republic’s Constitution before 
it was too late and warned that injustice delegitimizes a state, and called for vote 
cancelation. He also emphasized that in order to achieve “our” goals people need to 
continue their efforts and continue what they did before the elections. In his next 
statements, Mousavi repeatedly described himself as only one follower and comrade of 
the movement.  
          By the same token, in an open letter to the Guardian Council, Karoubi asked the 
council to follow its legitimate duty and declare the election results null. He asked the 
council to cancel the vote and prepare for a new round of elections and by doing so save 
the regime. He argued that there is a danger of people turning against the council. 
Karoubi also gave his compliments and blessing to the street demonstrators and criticized 
the regime for relating them to “foreign powers.”62  In the same letter, Karoubi argued 
that the high turnout was because people hoped there would be no vote rigging if they 
turned out in numbers, but that unfortunately there is a “mafia of power” that 
manipulated all the process.  
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           After the Guardian Council formed a group to investigate the alleged irregularities 
by only counting 10 percent of the votes, Karoubi in a letter to the council announced he 
would appoint his representative to the group only if his two conditions are respected. 
First, the members should be independent, which two of them are not and should be 
replaced. In the letter he noted that “some members of this group have held some harsh 
partisan stances, and as a matter of fact their dependent position in the group is already 
clear.”63  Second, if the Guardian Council decided to investigate all the irregularities 
reported by the defeated candidates, which go beyond counting only 10 percent of the 
votes.64 In the same letter he also insisted on vote cancellation; referring to the 
irregularities both before the election and on the day of the elections, and irregularities in 
announcing the election results, he declared that “each one of these are sufficient reasons 
to cancel the election results.”65 He went on to count different reasons for his request of 
vote cancellation such as the state’s alleged numbers for voters were greater than those 
eligible to vote. Referring to the Islamic Republic Constitution, he also argued that 
“individual competency” of the president is one of the basis of the Constitution which in 
his opinion was compromised by Ahmadinejad’s selection.  
            In the open letters that Karoubi wrote to the Islamic Republic’s officials, he 
repeatedly referred to the demonstrators as the “majority” of voters. He declared he did 
not consider the government formed after these elections “legitimate.” He clarified that 
both Ahmadinejad supporters and the demonstrators are part of the country, but he 
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believed that Ahmadinejad supporters are in minority and that no one can impose their 
vote on others. He also proposed two different dates to be considered for each of the 
supporters to be able to come to the streets peacefully to determine which camp is in 
majority. 
            During the height of the protests, both Mousavi and Karoubi repeatedly asked for 
permission from the Guardian Council and the interior ministry for their supporters to 
carry out peaceful demonstrations across the country. All of those requests were rejected. 
Despite the fact that the authorities rejected the calls for peaceful demonstrations, 
Mousavi and Karoubi appeared in several street demonstrations among the crowd in the 
height of the protests. In one of those Mousavi addressed the crowd, promising to stand 
by the people until the end. His wife, Zahra Rahnavard was beside him, with a follower 
in her hands, symbolizing peace.66 The requests to carry out peaceful demonstrations 
based on freedom of assembly, which is embedded in the Islamic Republic’s constitution, 
further delegitimized the state by not even allowing the opposition to use the capacities 
and rights allocated to them under the constitution. It also helped to frame the protests in 
a non-violent and lawful manner, seeking to act under the constitution. 
           Both Mousavi and Karoubi have considered the Islamic Republics’ Constitution as 
a framework for the opposition, emphasizing on the capacities for reform and change 
under the same Constitution only if the officials act upon it. Despite appearing among the 
protesters in the early days of demonstrations, Mousavi and Karoubi canceled the street 
protests scheduled for the first anniversary of the Green Movement in fear of high levels 
of violence planned by the regime, after not being able to get authorization from the 
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officials. This resulted in many analysts criticizing them for exhausting the youthful 
energy and opportunities that are embedded in street demonstrations.  In their letters and 
statements, both of these figures warned the crowd against engaging in violent activities 
with Basiji’s and other regime elements and asked the demonstrators to remain peaceful 
while insisting on their legitimate rights.  
            The wives of Mousavi and Karoubi played an important role in promoting women 
rights during the presidential campaign and encouraging people to vote. This was the first 
time in the history of the Islamic Republic that candidates were seen alongside their 
wives in public on the campaign trips, showing a more moderate face. After what 
followed, wives of the two (now) opposition figures gave speeches in defense of the 
demonstrators and appeared among the crowd in street protests. Zahra Rahnavard, 
Mousavi’s wife, is herself a well-known faculty member and a political activist. She took 
part in several visits alongside Mousavi to the families of those killed or arrested during 
the protests. In one of her video messages she declared that she is not afraid of getting 
arrested or even killed, for she is one among many who are fighting for freedom.67 
            Fatemeh Karoubi has also held several official posts, from being a member of the 
Majles to head of a charity organization. When their son was arrested and tortured in 
prison during the protests, in an open letter to the supreme leader, she recalled the Pahlavi 
regime by noting that she had raised her three children behind the Pahlavi prison doors 
waiting for their father to come back home—an ironic comparison of the Islamic 
Republic with the Pahlavi regime, as well as reminding the Supreme Leader of the 
sacrifices made by her husband during the revolution in the years preceding 1979. She 
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then went on to declare that her family would resist injustice. Their presence and their 
defense of women rights gave the election campaign a momentum and encouraged many 
to vote for these candidates in a society where women do not have same rights as men 
and even often discussion of these rights has harsh consequences.  
           The comparison between the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic Republic in terms of 
establishment of tyranny is another key characteristic found in statements by Mousavi 
and Karoubi, which further de-legitimize the regime. In a joint statement published on the 
anniversary of establishment of the Islamic Republic they listed some elements of Pahlavi 
tyranny such as blocking all the paths toward a gradual reform of the state and the 
society; using propaganda; the illusion of playing a big role in the regional and world 
politics; and sorting out all the critiques and opposition groups,68 and declared that the 
current situation of the country is nothing less than re-producing the monarchial tyranny, 
except it not being an inheritable style of governance. They noted that this is tyranny in 
the name of religion. Mousavi and Karoubi declared the Green Movement as an 
illustration of collective responsibility, of a new way of conversation against the threat of 
tyranny and warned that nothing would prevent this conversation from flourishing. A 
conversation while not ignoring past positive achievements, critiques past mistakes.  
            Cracks among elites were shown explicitly in televised debates between the 
candidates. Ahmadinejad, in his debate with Mousavi, accused Rafsanjani, one of the 
most prominent and influential figures in power plays of the state since 1979 revolution, 
of fraud. This resulted in reactions from supporters of both sides. These televised debates 
and strong criticisms of Ahmadinejad delegitimized his government. Moreover, it 
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encouraged many to vote for Mousavi and Karoubi as they saw the explicit cracks among 
elites (the left wing, the right wing, and the fundamentalists) and explicit criticism of past 
policies by both of them.  
In the 2009 elections and during the protests, Rafsanjani tried to calm the situation 
by sometimes taking the protesters’ side and other times inviting people to follow the 
rules and stay calm. On a Friday Prayer that he hosted during the street protests, he 
explicitly declared his disappointment with the way the regime had handled the 
demonstrations and called for release of political prisoners.69 Many Iranians attended the 
prayers for a chance to hear his speech and use the regime’s event to protest. Rafsanjani, 
who was a frequent speaker for the Friday Prayers has not had a chance since then to give 
the sermons again at any other Friday prayers.    
           Karoubi was the first regime insider who revealed and publicized massive torture, 
murder and sexual abuse of the demonstrators in the prisons. The most notorious one was 
Kahrizak prison in Tehran. In a letter to Rafsanjani he alleged that he had evidence that 
people were raped in the prisons, noting that this was not a random activity but a 
common one. He warned if Rafsanjani did not respond to his letter in ten days he would 
publish the letter in his party’s newspaper: Etemad-e Melli (“National Trust”). In an 
article in the newspaper he wrote “you may not believe that in Islamic Republic and 
under velayat-e Faghih young men and women are being sexually abused, but I am 
referring to the evidence by four of these people who have been abused in the prisons.”70 
He called these incidences a “catastrophe” for the Islamic regime. In an open letter to 
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Karoubi, Mousavi complemented his courage to reveal these acts and noted that these are 
signs of more terrible activities that we do not know yet going on in the prisons. 
According to Mousavi, the regime elements were doing these acts under the pretext of 
defending the Islamic republic system, not knowing that the bases of a regime are the 
people. He also criticized the religious figures for keeping silent in face of such activities. 
           The activities of the two main opposition figures process traced in this chapter, 
and their implications to frame and to some extent organize the Green Movement, are 
summarized in figure 3.1. below: 
Figure 3.1. Main Opposition Figures’ Activities and Their Implications  
Activity/ Statement  Implications and Importance  
Rejecting “unlawfulness” and “lying” by 
Ahmadinejad government  
Framing their campaign and resistance based 
on “truth”/ rejecting violence 
Referring to Islamic values/ not rejecting 
velayat-e faghih 
At odds with many movement adherents/ 
gathers support from more religious groups/ 
makes it divers/ slows down the revolutionary 
course  
Only a “comrade” of the movement not its 
leaders  
De-centralized/ diverse  
Letters to the supreme leader and the Guardian 
Council 
Delegitimizing their authority by showing 
unresponsiveness  
Constitution as the movement framework Movement’s lawfulness and peaceful goals/ 
rejecting violence/delegitimizing of the system 
by not acting upon law 
Comparison between the Islamic Republic and 
Pahlavi monarchy  
De-legitimization/ rejecting tyranny in any 
form and in name of religion  
Zahra Rahnavard and Fatemeh Karoubi 
activities  
Promoting women rights and participation/ 
rejecting discrimination and violence  
Prison revelations  De-legitimization of Islamic rule, provoking 
emotions among crowds (i.e. anger, shock) 
 
           From the content of Mousavi and Karoubi’s statements and their activities process 
traced thus far, it is clear that these leaders emphasize three aspects about the Green 
Movement: First, a non-violent and peaceful approach in achieving its goals, which were 
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vote cancellation and ballot recounts in early stages of the movement and became more 
radical with unresponsiveness of the authorities to demonstrators’ demands and massive 
crack downs and arrests. The leaders of the movement on the other hand have repeatedly 
emphasized that the Islamic Republic’s Constitution is the main framework for designing 
the movement’s tactics in achieving its goals. As the demands of the demonstrators went 
beyond vote cancellation and targeted top figures of the regime such as the Supreme 
Leader, Mousavi and Karoubi, while criticizing and condemning the authorities’ actions 
and demanding free elections, and while repeatedly attacking tyranny, refused to target 
Velyat-e-faghih whom many see as the main obstacle to free elections and democracy.  
          This leads to the second aspect of the movement recognized by the Green 
Movement’s so-called leaders: its lawfulness, considering Islamic Republic’s 
Constitution as their framework and demanding full implementation of the law, by 
emphasizing the Constitution’s Third Chapter which addresses the rights of people. 
Mousavi and Karoubi statements became more radical with unresponsiveness of the 
regime and harsh crackdowns on demonstrators.  
          Mousavi published eighteen statements from June to October 2009, during the 
height of Iran’s election turmoil. Statement number eighteen is known as the Green 
Movement Charter in which he describes movement’s goals, strategies, and tactics to 
achieve them. Emphasizing non-violent ways to achieve the movement’s goals and the 
rule of law, his statements become more radicalized in criticizing regime’s response to 
demonstrators. In his 5th statement he announced his disappointment with the Guardian 
Council in responding to complaints of vote rigging and stated “in this situation, they ask 
us to follow up our complaints with the Guardian Council. Now this council has proved 
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its dependency before, during, and after the elections. And the first rule in any judgment 
is the body’s independence.”71 
          The third aspect of the movement emphasized by Mousavi and Karoubi is its de-
centralized, network-based, and diverse character, which makes it easy to debate 
movement’s goals within and with its opponents outside. The revised Green Movement’s 
Charter, which was published by the ‘coordinating council of the green path of hope’72 
and signed by both Mousavi and Karoubi reads, “the Green Movement cannot be 
considered as a centralized party, nor it can be regarded as disorganized body of people 
with no specific goals […] the Green Movement has a coordinated and horizontal 
organizing force in the form of real and virtual social movement networks, is based on 
knowledge, conscious, and innovations of Iranian people and searches its ideals and goals 
such as liberty and justice in this innovating force. This ability can change the slogan 
“every Iranian, one campaign” to “every Iranian, one movement.”73 The Charter article 
describes the dependence of the movement on the deliberation of Iranians who 
participated in the elections and its aftermath events to change the course of political 
activity in their country.  
           In the Green Movement’s Charter, despite other statements of Mousavi, there is 
little reference to velayat-e-faghih and more emphasis on the basis of democracy such as 
demanding a return to the rule of law and defying the political context of movement and 
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  Mousavi’s	  5th	  statement	  to	  the	  Nation.	  [translation	  by	  author].	  Message	  posted	  to	  
http://bahmanagha.blogspot.com/2009/06/blog-­‐post_326.html	  
72	  The	  council	  that	  Mousavi	  and	  Karoubi	  formed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  regime	  crackdowns	  to	  continue	  the	  
Green	  Movement’s	  cause.	  The	  council	  members	  became	  publicly	  active	  after	  Mousavi	  and	  Karoubi’s	  
communication	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  became	  more	  difficult	  and	  they	  went	  under	  house	  arrest.	  The	  council	  
publishes	  statements	  and	  news	  on	  the	  two	  leaders	  from	  time	  to	  time	  and	  whenever	  they	  get	  access	  to	  
them.	  	  
73Full	  text	  of	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  Green	  Movement’s	  charter.	  	  Published	  by	  the	  Coordinating	  Council	  of	  
the	  Green	  Path	  of	  Hope.	  Source:	  Kaleme.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.kaleme.com/1389/12/03/klm-­‐
48610/	  
	   89	  
the authorities’ acts which is rather based on rule by law.74 The movement’s charter 
reveals one of the main strategies of the movement is achieving full implementation of 
law that has been given legitimacy by people’s vote. It clarifies in another article that the 
Green Movement is aware of the fact that rule of law is not synonym to instrumental 
abuse of law by the rulers. The law should not be a way to repress people’s rights as 
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
          The goals of the movement are also described as achieving liberty, social justice, 
and the right of national self-determination, which were the goals of the nation during the 
1979 revolution as well. The charter clarifies that only by reinforcing civil society, public 
conversations and debates, education and free movement of the press, information, and 
the media, can the goals of the movement be achieved. It also states that although the 
movement’s framework is the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, people have the right to 
debate and vote to change the Constitution (or any article of it) whenever they choose to 
do so in a free and democratic atmosphere.  
THE GREEN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
         The process tracing of activities of the main opposition figures and their statements 
reveals the main characteristics of the Green Movement leadership and their congruity 
with the course of actions that each of these two have taken in the height of the protest. 
These four main characteristics are discussed below. 
          First, it is a network-based leadership, from the election campaign to the 
demonstrations it has proven to be a movement based on network of individuals and not a 
hieratical leadership. The political activists design strategies and if there is enough 
debate, then the strategy is announced by the figures of the movement (Mousavi and 
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Karoubi)75 and in their absence by the coordination council. There is little evidence of a 
charismatic type of leadership in the Green Movement; based on one individual’s 
decision making and a mass of followers without agency, rather moral and to some 
degree pragmatic types of leadership are more dominant. The main opposition figures 
have taken the role of movement’s orators that transmit the movement’s goals and 
aspirations both to Islamic republic officials and to movement’s adherents and outside to 
gather support.  
           Second, the Green Movement leadership is de-centralized. On one side, the 
reformist groups are part of the movement, which because of three decades of 
cooperation and political activity are better coordinated and act within a more organized 
framework. But, there are secular, leftists, religious, and groups with gender, sexual, or 
tribal agendas, that coordinate their activities with their core movement and with others 
under the umbrella of the Green Movement. The Iranian civil society and its social 
movement networks, looking back to the experience of 1979 revolution and its 
shortcomings and problems, are trying to reject centralization of power in any kind.  
          Third, the Green Movement is a diverse and interactive movement. Its non-
ideological character and its adherents from diverse classes of society cannot support a 
charismatic or ideological leadership and lean more toward a logical and pragmatic 
leadership style. The leadership in such a diverse movement has to interact with all of its 
adherents from different class, religious, and ideological backgrounds. This interaction 
can take advantage of different forces and resources in order for the movement to be 
successful. 
                                                
75Mousavi	  and	  Karoubi	  are	  under-­‐house	  arrest	  as	  of	  February	  2011.	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          Fourth, its leadership is based on compromises. The activists of the Green 
Movement have shown that they can build compromises on their minimum demand, 
despite the diversity of ideas and demands. The fact that people decided to take part in 
the elections despite the surveillance of the Guardian Council and despite the fact that 
Mousavi and Karoubi both insisted on their loyalty to the Islamic republic’s system, 
shows that the activists can categorize and prioritize their demands and take action based 
on that. 
         Process tracing of activities and statements of Mousavi and Karoubi reveal that 
these two men, rather than being movement mobilizers, hold an important role in framing 
the movement in terms that were discussed above. From the color green, to accepting 
different ideologies while emphasizing on Islamic values as their own main set of belief, 
and denouncing violent act in the face of the regime’s repression. Although, the role of 
the movement adherents in framing their options and naming the movement goals, 
discussed in chapter 2, should not be overlooked. In his statement after Ashura76 2009, 
Mousavi argues that people do not wait for him to publish statements and invite them to 
turn out to the streets and protest; rather they have the knowledge and courage to use the 
religious and regime occasions to protest. The fact that the protests started simultaneously 
and the Green Movement enjoys a network-based and decentralized leadership style is 
described by Abbas Milani77 as both the movement’s strength and weakness. In the short 
run, the lack of a strong and centralized leadership has resulted in failure of the Green 
Movement to achieve its main goal: a vote cancellation. Many criticize Mousavi and 
                                                
76A	  day	  of	  mourning	  for	  Shi’at	  Muslims.	  The	  Green	  Movements	  activists	  used	  the	  occasion	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  
streets	  and	  protest.	  The	  day	  marked	  one	  of	  the	  bloodiest	  crack	  downs	  by	  the	  police	  and	  the	  militia	  on	  the	  
demonstrators.	  
77Milani,	  Abbas.	  The	  Iran	  Premier:	  The	  Green	  Movement.	  United	  Sates	  Institute	  of	  Peace.	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-­‐movement	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Karoubi for not taking advantage of human resources and the political opportunities 
(cracks among elites, a relative openness before the elections) that were present during 
the height of the turmoil. In response they tend to argue for a non-violent and peaceful 
social movement, that does not repeat the mistakes of 1979 revolution, and limit the cost 
of political activism to its lowest against the regime’s repression. 
         The emphasis on non-violent struggle to achieve movement’s goals on one hand, 
and interaction between social movement networks to find innovative solutions to lower 
the cost of activism, on the other hand has strengthen the dialogue and deliberation 
among different movement adherents. In a post-religious, post-ideological, and post-class 
social movement, framing the movement process and compromise building between 
different social movement networks is a way to move the democratic discourse forward. 
The election campaign of Mousavi and Karoubi were able to do so during the month 
leading to the elections, but the known figures of the movement have come short to 
establish viable plans and a coordinating force to take advantage of their resources. It is 
true that different types of leadership emerge in different cultural and political contexts, 
but in a non-violent and civil struggle such as the Green Movement where the speedy 
revolutionary course of emotions after a while fades away, a degree of planning and 
coordination among movements’ adherents and resource mobilization on the part of the 
loose leadership is required in order to sustain the movement and take advantage of a 
citizenry’s deliberation and potential for democratization.  
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CHAPTER IV:  
THE INTERACTION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND FRAMING PROCESSES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
           In accounting for the emergence and form of a social movement, political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes are constantly 
interacting. This thesis analyzes four variables that reflect more on subjective and cultural 
aspects of the movement, rather than the structure of the system. These independent 
variables are: the availability of aggravated classes; the use of information 
communication technologies; ideologies (in terms of perceived legitimacy or 
illegitimacy); and leadership. This chapter establishes the interaction between these four 
variables and the structure of political opportunities and resource mobilization. Here I 
focus on four ‘consensual dimensions’ of political opportunity structures drawn by 
McAdam from various authors.  
           This chapter first establishes the interaction between political opportunity 
structures, resource mobilization, and framing processes in the emergence and form of 
the Green Movement. I argue that we need to attribute a central role to the framing 
processes in accounting for timing and form of the Green Movement during the height of 
the protests. Political opportunity structures appear in terms of perceptions of openness 
and instability of elite alignments, and not in terms of objective changes in the structure 
of the political system. Political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures come 
second in their interaction with framing processes and are mediators. Second, this chapter 
builds on the implications of these findings for framing processes.  
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           Borrowing from the literature review, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) point 
to a conviction and a consensus that most political movements and revolutions are set in 
motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or 
receptive to challenge. But these “political opportunities,” drawn from rational choice 
theory, are but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient 
organization—whether formal or informal—such opportunities are not likely to be 
seized. Finally mediating between the structural requirements of opportunity and 
organization are the emergent meanings and definitions, or frames, shared by the 
adherents of the burgeoning movement. The impetus to action, thus, is as much a cultural 
construction as it is a function of structural vulnerability. Such changes in the structure of 
politics encourage mobilization not only through the “objective” effects they have on 
power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further undermine the 
legitimacy of the system. Expanding political opportunities then derive their causal force 
from the interaction of those structural and perceptual changes they set in motion.  
           A similar reciprocal dynamic defines the relationship between organization and 
framing processes. Framing processes clearly encourage mobilization as people seek to 
organize and act on their growing awareness of system’s illegitimacy and vulnerability. 
At the same time, the potential for the kind of system critical framing processes is 
conditioned by the population’s access to various mobilizing structures. Also, framing 
processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequences under 
conditions of strong rather than weak organization. The absent of any real mobilizing 
structure would almost prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to 
afford a basis for collective action.  
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             Political opportunities in this study have been conceptualized in terms of changes 
in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political 
system. By mobilizing structure, this study refers to those collective vehicles, informal as 
well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. In terms 
of framing processes, the aim is “strategic framing,” that is conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action. Framing the ideas about right and wrong to 
nourish the movement’s goals are examined in terms of finding appropriate resources for 
mobilization as adherents weigh their options for taking action in the movement. 
            Various factors are involved in the emergence and form of a particular social 
movement. The scope of this study does not allow for in-depth analysis of each of these 
variables, nor is it possible to conduct in counterfactual analysis within a one case study 
to account for variations in each of the variables in their multiple and complex 
relationships with others. For example, more research questions will arise by 
systematically studying each of political opportunity variables, economy, or the 
organizational aspects of the movement. These questions will be discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
THE INTERACTION: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND FRAMING PROCESSES  
FRAMING, ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
           The Green Movement’s framing processes and organizational tactics directly 
impacted one another. As the adherents framed the movement goals in terms of vote 
cancellation and truth seeking aspirations, peaceful demonstrations were planned in 
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demand of reform and civil rights among the ‘informal social movement networks,’ 
which address the organizational dimensions of the Green Movement. These processes 
were brewing during the years leading to the summer of 2009 by way of everyday life 
micro-mobilization; structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement 
mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated: these include family units, 
friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of state structure 
itself (McCarthy 1996, p.141). Among the main platforms for such micro-mobilization 
among circles of individuals (friends, family, moderate elements of the regime) during 
the years leading to the elections have been the Internet; the blogosphere, and the social 
media. 
            These processes were shaping up among Internet users and bloggers as one space 
for conversation. Attempting to map these structures in a society, McCarthy asserts that 
at the least formally organized end of the map are “families” and “networks of friends” 
(1996, p.142).  It is upon these most basic structures of everyday life that much local 
dissent is built. These structures are in line with McAdam’s widely adopted concept of  
“micro-mobilization contexts” (1982) that suggests a wide variety of social sites within 
people’s daily rounds where informal ties between people can serve as solidarity and 
communication facilitating structures when and if they choose to go into dissent together.  
           When authoritarian regimes restrict access to ordinary forms of political 
participation, citizens in those regimes are often forced to improvise new forms of 
participation and occupy alternative spaces in order to do so. Asef Bayat (2010) refers to 
such actions as “quiet encroachment,” and argues that they typify the experiences of 
ordinary citizens across the Middle East. Quiet encroachment takes advantage of spaces 
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that autocratic regimes cannot control or have not fully controlled. Within these spaces, 
citizens establish a different public order that exists largely outside the state-dominated 
sphere of formal politics.   
            Because the activities of quiet encroachment are neither centrally organized nor 
state- or NGO-supported, Bayat refers to them as social “nonmovements” (59).  
Nonmovements establish loose networks of familiarity and solidarity but they do not lead 
directly to a politics of organized protest or struggle. Instead they are the result of 
unorganized individual direct actions that aim at the “redistribution of social goods” and 
the attainment of “autonomy, both cultural and political, from the regulations, 
institutions, and discipline imposed by the state and modern institutions” (59).   
           We may view Bayat’s notion of  “quiet encroachment” into spaces (actual and 
virtual) in authoritarian states is a way for citizens to build loose networks that can be 
activated and ‘turned political’ in certain circumstances.  The Internet and the social 
media are examples of such spaces in the Middle East where ‘informal networks’ of 
friends and activists had been discussing and framing ideas about right or wrong that 
undermines the systems’ legitimacy to rule.  
The role of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) in recent events 
during the Arab Spring uprisings and earlier in the summer of 2009 in the aftermath of 
elections in Iran, should be analyzed not only in terms of the ‘information,’ but the 
‘access’ they provide for lay citizens to engage in conversation and exchanging ideas. For 
example in Iran many journalists, women rights activists, communists, seculars, […] and 
the diaspora turned to Internet to express their views during the years leading to 2009 
uprisings, using the virtual world to bypass the state’s control in the real world. In closed 
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authoritarian states with few freedoms of expression, the Internet and social media are 
one of the main platforms for communication between circles of friends, and activists.  
            These loose networks of individuals and the “quiet encroachment” space the ICTs 
provide, translate into the real world when a majority of citizens view their conditions as 
relatively deprived vis-à-vis the status quo. In the case of the 2009 Green Movement in 
Iran, citizens used ICTs as tools to disseminate information, debating movements’ frames 
and strategies, and organizing around their cause. At the height of a social movement in 
authoritarian systems of governance, ICTs, by connecting activists to other adherents, the 
outside world, and the mainstream media, function as the main source of communication 
and information dissemination. The Green Movement’s framework, strategies and 
organization were mainly discussed on the web (the social media and the blogs), between 
‘informal social networks,’ which provide many more people a voice. The Green 
Movement was not dependent upon a central organization or website, did not follow any 
specific ideology, rather it was dependent on every individual’s creativity and 
deliberative agency that gave the movement its momentum.  
           More important than information dissemination, the focus in considering the role 
of ICTs in states where citizens have limited access to formal civil society networks 
should be ‘access.’ The Internet has changed the rules by taking part in the political 
game. For example, analysis of Iran’s blogosphere during the years leading to the 2009 
demonstrations reveals three interconnected issues. First, it leads us to the vast number of 
voices and ideas that find a space to be heard. Second, it demonstrates the importance of 
the free space that is provided for these individuals and organizations to express their 
views. And third, the range of topics that they introduce into the public sphere is being 
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revealed, thus surpassing the system’s censorship of many social issues and making 
public of previously inarticulate and un-noticed social issues, such as gender relations, or 
political discussions. Considering ICTs as another tool, taking up the role of radio, 
television, and cassette tapes in the 1960s and 1970s, to disseminate information and 
mobilize masses undermines the bottom-up space for conversation that they provide 
during years prior to emergence of a social movement. The ‘informal social movement 
networks’ with diverse participants, and de-centralized and non-hierarchical organization 
were able to keep the Green Movement viable even after months of facing repression by 
the Islamic Republic.  
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES  
             The four consensual dimensions of political opportunity structures offered by 
McAdam (1996) are: first, the relative openness and closure of institutional political 
system; second, the stability of elite alignments; third, the presence of elite allies; and 
fourth, the state’s capacity for repression. One dimension of consensual political 
opportunity is stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran has been divided between two main camps since its establishment in 
1979. The leftist camp leans toward Khomeini’s ideals and social justice which today 
constitute many reformists, and the rightists, which today constitute more hardliner 
elements of the regime that are closer to the supreme leader, Khamenei. Mousavi and 
Karoubi were both leaning toward leftist wings of the Islamic Republic during the early 
years of the revolution. These ideological divisions among the so-called leaders of the 
Green Movement and rightists, who were strongly backed by the Supreme Leader at the 
time of the elections, have been constant since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 
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There were not any alignment shifts within the system. Mousavi and Karoubi never 
rejected the system’s fundamental values in their statements, both before the movement’s 
emergence and after it took momentum.  
            There was not much instability in terms of structural changes of elite alignments 
before the 2009 elections that could have impacted the emergence of the movement. 
Rather, the voters tried to shift the elite alignments and the power structure by voting, 
unlike the boycott of the elections in 2005. They framed their collective will around the 
goal of pushing Ahmadinejad out of presidential office. The perceived logic in the 
months leading to the elections was that by voting in massive numbers there would not be 
any possibilities of vote rigging by the regime. They hoped for a landslide victory for one 
of the candidates closer to the reformist camp, taking Khatami’s landslide victory in 
previous elections as inspiration for their action.  
           In fact the supreme leader encouraged Iranians to go out and vote. Giving a degree 
of freedoms to those closer to the reform camp to campaign and gather supporters 
(specially the youth) was part of regime’s strategies to increase the voter turnout, and by 
doing so to increase the legitimacy of the system. Official election results put the voter 
turnout around 85 percent, with 63% of the electorate voting for Ahmadinejad.78 The 
regime did not estimate that the situation could get out of control after the elections. On 
one hand, the Islamic Republic implemented a strategy of stick and carrot; a degree of 
openness before the election, massive security presence on the day of elections, and 
repression from that moment afterward. On the part of the Green Movement adherents, 
                                                
78	  Official	  results	  of	  Iran’s	  Interim	  Ministry	  for	  the	  10th	  presidential	  election.	  Available	  at:	  	  
http://moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=832a711b-­‐95fe-­‐4505-­‐8aa3-­‐
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  shows	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  official	  votes	  gained	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this ‘perceptual’ openness re-enforced their shared identity to change the course of the 
actions, aware of the Guardian Council’s control and structural closure of Islamic 
Republic’s institutions.   
          The stick and carrot strategy, the high intensity of political activities during the 
months leading to the elections, and strong attacks by both Mousavi and Karoubi on 
Ahmadinejad policies, led to the perception that the system was becoming more open to 
criticism. Supporters of presidential hopefuls perceived some degree of openness of the 
system to freedom of expression and freedom of political activities. Despite the 
surveillance of the Guardian Council,79 the voters tried to employ legitimate structures of 
the system in their own advantage. The structural barriers to citizens’ access to 
institutional power had not been changed in any objective way. Rather the movement 
adherents decided to take advantage of minimal electoral opportunities. These 
opportunities were constant and similar to the previous elections held by the Islamic 
Republic. The difference must be sought in other factors to account for emergence and 
form of the Green Movement.  
             From the four consensual dimensions of political opportunity structures 
introduced by McAdam, the presence of elite allies has impacted the movement in 
positive ways. Mousavi and Karoubi’s speeches and activities, before and during the 
height of the movement, both influenced some to go out and vote, and had a positive 
impact in the loose organizational framing of the Green Movement. However, we need to 
account for the fact that both of these men were elements from within the regime and 
have held several key posts in the Islamic Republic. Their candidacy was perceived as an 
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  Presidential	  nominees	  are	  selected	  by	  the	  Guardian	  Council,	  which	  its	  members	  are	  appointed	  by	  Iran’s	  
supreme	  leader,	  Khamenei.	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opportunity to balance against the hardliner policies enforced by Ahmadinejad, both at 
the national and international level. This leads to another dimension of the Green 
Movement, its emphasis on non-revolutionary activities which might result in a speedy 
regime change. Movement adherents still tried to change the course by participating in 
elections, seeing capacities for reform and trying to take advantage of the minimal 
structural opportunities offered to them; that is façade elections.  
           The degree of freedom that was protected by the regime during the election 
campaigns was soon diminished by the military’s heavy presence on the streets on the 
day of the elections, and by Internet and mobile telephone disruptions. The 
demonstrations erupted simultaneously and repression can be seen on the streets of 
Tehran on the very first day of the protests. Although Mousavi and Karoubi both 
denounced the election results, they both joined the street protests a few days after 
movement adherents remained in the streets. There is no official data on the number of 
the demonstrators, although some sources put it at hundreds of thousands and the pictures 
and videos shared on Youtube and other social media websites show a vast number of 
people taking part. The demonstrations erupted on June 13, 2009, when the results were 
announced one day after the elections were held. Mousavi and Karoubi showed up among 
the demonstrators in the streets of Tehran on June 15th. Although both men denounced 
the election results and vowed to not to give up on getting their votes back, there was no 
guarantee that they would join the street protests since they were both insiders to the 
Islamic Republic’s system. 
          Discussing the interrelationship between political opportunities, framing and the 
mobilizing structures, McCarthy asserts that more stable elements of political opportunity 
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are central in shaping the available range of mobilizing structures in the longer run. And, 
more volatile elements of political opportunity are important in understanding the shorter 
run choices among those available structures that activists make. The most stable element 
of the political structure in the summer of 2009 in Iran was the willingness of the regime 
to repress the protests from the day they emerged. Despite this massive repression the 
movement adherents remained in the streets for several months.  It is true that repression 
blocked and to some degree shaped how movement adherents decided not to participate 
in high-risk activities such as street protests after several months. But the non-violent 
strategies of the movement, and its loose and de-centralized structure were first framed 
both by the adherents and the well-known figures of the movement, and the adherents did 
not engage in reciprocal violence. The impact of four consensual dimensions of political 
opportunity structures on emergence and form of the Green Movement is summarized in 
figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1.The Implications for Political Opportunity Structures  
 
Political Opportunity Structures  Implication/Impact  
Openness of the institutional system Perceived  
Instability of elite alignments  Perceived  
Presence of elite allies  Positive  
Repression Negative   *(in terms of movement’s 
progression) 
 
           The emergence and form of a movement is dependent upon interplay of structural, 
organizational, and framing variables. These variables include relative openness or 
closure of the institutional system; stability or instability of elite alignments; the presence 
or absence of elite allies; and the capacity of the system to repress; resources to 
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mobilizing and organization (money, human capital, organizational tools, etc.); and 
frames that give values and meaning to the collective action.  These elements are 
constantly interacting, only the degree to which they impact a given movement varies. In 
the case of the Green Movement, framing processes were key both to the emergence and 
form of the movement. This explains for the framework to avoid violence, calls for a 
national referendum, demand for truth and civil rights, and de-centralized, and non-
hierarchical aspects of its leadership and organization. Collective Values and meanings to 
shape the strategic framing of the Green Movement were dependent upon individual 
agency of each of the movement’s adherents and were not dictated by a charismatic 
leader or a formal social movement organization (SMO). Rather its loose networks of 
individual and circles of friends and families formed a collective frame to ask ‘where is 
my vote?’ 
          Among the four aspects of McAdam’s political opportunity structures, I argue that 
the presence of elite allies and perceived openness of the system had had a positive 
impact on the timing and form of the Green Movement. As discussed above, structural 
variables are not strong indicators for the timing of the movement, but they are present.  
In the case of the Green Movement framing processes had the central role. Structural 
variables and organization only mediated between these collective framing processes. 
They are necessary elements in order to account for success or failure of the movement, 
but not sufficient to explain for its timing and form.  
          Political opportunities have impacted the Green Movement’s timing and form in 
terms of ‘perceptual’ rather than ‘objective’ expansions of opportunities in the structure 
of the system. The movement’s adherents framed and organized their activities with this 
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perception. As McAdam notes the kinds of structural changes and power shifts that are 
most defensibly conceived of as political opportunity should not be confused with the 
collective processes by which these changes are interpreted and framed.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR FRAMING PROCESSES AND MOVEMENT’S SHORT-
TERM VIABILITY 
THE CONTEXT 
            The Green Movement adherents only slightly try to frame the symbols and 
activities based on massive repression and unresponsiveness of the Islamic republic 
system to their demands. In spite of the repression, movement adherents remained 
peacefully in the streets for several months. The 1979 revolution is the context within 
which the 2009 Green Movement is framing its strategies and demands. A revolution that 
according to many scholars was being hijacked by a minority of Islamist groups that 
established an Islamic Republic state, in the course of the speedy regime change that 
brought down the Pahlavi Dynasty. Movement adherents did not opt for such change this 
time.  
            The 1999 student protests are another context. The moderate policies of 
Khatami’s ‘reform government’ were being preferred in 2009 by the youth in comparison 
to Ahmadinejad’s hardliner policies. The 1999 student protests cannot be considered as 
indications for conditions of ‘failed reforms,’ in discussing the structural variables. 
Rather as McAdam notes, movements tend to cluster in time and space because they are 
not independent of each other. The framing of the Green Movement was influenced by 
1999 protests to re-interpret their situations in light of the available master frame (a stolen 
vote) and to mobilize based on the new understandings of themselves and the world 
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around them. Thus, the presence of such a frame constitutes yet another cultural or 
ideological resource that facilitates movement emergence. This aspect also reflects upon 
what Zald (1996) calls the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical events in 
providing opportunities for framing. The emphasis on Iranian identities rather than 
Islamic one, also reflects on what he refers to as cultural construction of repertoires of 
contention and frames (261).  
            Zald asserts that culture, ideology, and strategic framing are linked because they 
are the topics that deal with the content and processes by which meaning is attached to 
objects and actions. Culture he argues is the shared beliefs and understandings mediated 
by and constituted by symbols and language of a group or society.  In 2009, the Green 
Movement tries to re-awaken the Iranian culture and identity. In this sense the color 
green not only refers to Islamic values, but rather more than that it presents the re-birth of 
the nature, spring; the Iranian new year and of that the beginning of a new political 
culture.80 Movement adherents constantly tried to innovate frames and strategies that 
build on this culture.  
“COGNITIVE LIBERATION” 
            McAdam (2000), with the notion of “cognitive liberation,” has identified four 
general types of “expanding cultural opportunities” that appear to increase the likelihood 
of movement activity (p.254). These four are: first, the dramatization of a glaring 
contradiction between a highly salient cultural value and conventional social practice. 
Second, “suddenly imposed grievances.” This cognitive stimulus to framing processes 
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  This	  aspiration	  to	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  Iranian	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  an	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describes those dramatic, highly publicized, and generally unexpected events—human 
made disasters, court decisions, official violence—that increase public awareness and 
opposition to previously accepted social conditions. Third, dramatization of a system’s 
vulnerability or illegitimacy, this is another “cultural” or “cognitive opportunity” that 
may stimulus increased framing or other forms of mobilization. Fourth, the availability of 
what Snow and Benford (1988) term “master protest frames” within which subsequent 
challengers can map their own grievances and demands. These expanding opportunities 
are all cultural and cognitive.  
As Tilly (2009) calls attention to cultural breaks and cultural contradictions that 
lead to action and policy imperatives only as they are defined in an active process of 
cultural and movement construction. Political and mobilization opportunities are often 
created by cultural breaks and the surfacing of long dormant contradictions that reframe 
grievances and injustice and reinforce the possibility of action. Cultural contradictions 
occur and lead into mobilization when two or more cultural themes that are potentially 
contradictory are brought into active contradiction by the force of events, or when the 
realities of behavior are seen to be substantially different than the ideological 
justifications for the movement. 
           The cultural and cognitive “suddenly imposed grievances” can politicize 
individuals’ identities and give the impetus for collective action. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, relative deprivation and social identity theories posit that movement adherents 
should perceive inequality and illegitimacy of their conditions vis-a-vis the status quo in 
order to engage in collective action. Further, they should perceive the status quo as 
unstable and should be able to frame alternatives to it. The initial shock of “a stolen vote” 
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politicized and produced a collective identity that imagined an alternative to its deprived 
conditions. Adherents demanded this alternative in form of ‘vote recount’,‘authorization 
for a peaceful demonstration’ and a ‘national referendum’, to be able to gather support 
from those who were not willing to risk in face of the repression and in order to stay 
within the non-violent framework of the Green Movement. Calls for a referendum came 
mainly from the movement’s well-known figures; the two ‘turned-to-opposition’ figures, 
Mousavi and Karoubi. As the Islamic Republic did not cede to demands of the protesters 
and the lack of legitimacy of the system glared dramatically by repressing the protests, 
the street slogans became more radical; chanting “death to the dictator,” or even at some 
points “death to the Supreme Leader.” This, however, never was articulated by the 
movements’ figures Mousavi and Karoubi, and nor was it agreed upon by movement 
adherents.  
Some have criticized this aspect as lack of unity and defined goals among the 
demonstrators and the leaders. In contrast, I argue that the unwillingness on behalf of 
Mousavi and Karoubi to denounce the position of the Supreme Leader impacted the 
movement in two positive ways. First, Iran is a country with many believing in Islamic 
values. By not rejecting the role of velayat-e faghih (“the rule of the jurist”) and not 
signaling out the Islamic values, they were able to gather more people around 
movement’s collective identity. The reference to the color green holds also symbolic 
Islamic values. At the same time, they announced several times that the movement 
encompasses all beliefs and identities and has not framed itself under any ideological 
umbrella. Second, it enabled to frame the movement goals (both by so-called leaders and 
movement adherents) under full implementation of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution. 
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By doing so, they could clearly ask for authorization for peaceful demonstrations and 
vote recount, as well as full implementation of the law in any aspect. This would 
establish a clear pathway for movement adherents and their demands.  
            After all, the demonstrations were born out of elections. The voters had perceived 
a relative opportunity and openness to change the course of the actions and policies of the 
government by taking part in elections. Reform within the constitutional laws, in other 
words, must not have been out of order. Thus, taking part in elections indicates the 
willingness of the movement’s adherents to act within the Islamic republic’s Constitution 
as a starting point; hoping for a more moderate president that would reform the course 
that Ahmadinejad had been taken in his internal and external policies. ‘A stolen vote’ 
also provided a “master frame” under which groups and individuals with different 
ideologies could map their grievances and demands.  
           Demands for basic civil rights of free and fair elections indicate the non-violent 
aspirations of Green Movement activists. The demonstrations could have turned more 
violent if the movement adherents had decided to frame their strategies in respond to the 
state violence. In contrast, they refused to take part in any activity that could result in 
speedy and violent courses of interaction and perhaps change. Their demands came out 
an election; that is the most civil and official way of expression of rights and wrongs and 
choices possible within the Islamic Republic framework. The ‘silent demonstration’, 
discussed in Chapter Two, is one good example of civil ways of claiming the ‘stolen 
vote’. Other examples include demands for a referendum, not engaging in violence in 
kind with the regime elements, and cancelling the demonstrations because of the high 
risks of violence. Discussing the movement’s strategies and frames by the grassroots 
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mainly on the Internet (the blogosphere and social media) also indicates deliberation and 
agency on the part of movement adherents.  
THE FRAMING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROSPECTS  
           Green Movement activists, however, do not all hold the same ideology. Rather, 
during the height of the elections they managed to organize and find common ground in 
continuous interpretations of movements goals, strategies, and courses of action within 
the movement and in interaction to the outside world. This reflects upon what Zirakzadeh 
(1997) calls the “popular culture,” which posits that in society rich cultural currents are 
being constantly developed by ordinary people in restaurants, cafes, streets, and the cyber 
space where people speak about their sufferings and ways how to approach them. Despite 
elite’s efforts to influence the thinking of non-elites, the latter repeatedly question the 
elite’s definition of reality in the daily expressions of popular culture and within social 
movements. This reflects upon truth-seeking aspect of the movement in the height of the 
protests and during the election campaigns, emphasized by the ‘opposition figures’, 
which further undermines the legitimacy of the system. The Green Movement’s survival 
and success, however, depends on how it forms its “autonomous culture,” which holds 
that the social movements themselves are climates and environments, in which new 
subversive ideas are invented and nurtured. 
           Symbolic and strategic framing of the Green Movement was useful in initial 
phases of the protests and for its short-term viability, but was not efficient for sustaining 
the action mobilization. Rucht (1996) asserts that for large scale and sustained movement 
activities mobilization requires resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames, 
skills, and technological tools to process and distribute information and to influence 
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people (p.186). By movement structure he refers to the organizational bases and 
mechanisms serving to collect and use the movement’s resources.  
           The movement can realize its potential to be strong and successful to the extent it 
takes this context into consideration and makes it resonant by structural attunement, 
strategic calculation, and clever use of leverage points. This requires an identification and 
“exploitation” of patterns that work in favor of the movement and the avoidance of that 
which could weaken it.  In the case of the Green Movement this “exploitation” did not 
take place. Further questions about building on de-centralization and non-hierarchical 
structures of the movement while strengthening the organizational structures needed to 
connect the social movement networks in conditions of repression require more attention 
for long-term viability of the movement. These questions and further questions regarding 
the structural variables will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER V: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigated grassroots identities in contemporary Iran by process 
tracing their use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) during the period 
that triggered the emergence and form of the Green Movement. The role of movement 
leadership was also investigated in order to determine which types of leadership styles 
are most relevant to the Green Movement. Current theories of social movements posit 
that agentic, structural, and mobilization variables continuously interact to account for 
emergence and form of a particular social movement. Keeping the interaction constant, 
this study mainly explored the agency in its interaction with other independent variables 
in order to determine whether or not we could delegate the central role in emergence and 
form of the Green Movement to the framing processes that give values to the goals and 
strategies of the movement. In this concluding chapter, I provide a response to the 
hypotheses suggested in Chapter One. Then, I discuss future implications for the study of 
social movements in general, and the Green Movement in particular, as well as, the 
research limitations. 
ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Political opportunity structures are constantly impacted by mobilizing 
structures and framing processes. In the case of the Green Movement emergence and 
form, the central role should be given to the framing processes rather than the political 
opportunity structures. 
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Investigation of the socio-cultural structures and identities of the grassroots with a 
focus on Internet users and bloggers indicates that the emergence and form of the Green 
Movement in 2009 mainly borrows from the framing processes that shaped ideas about 
right or wrong and had reduced the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy to the minimum level, 
making it susceptible for a broad-based social movement to exploit it. These framing 
processes that gave values and meanings to the movement adherents’ goals and strategies 
were made possible through cognitive opportunities that had stimulus increased framing. 
These expanding cultural and cognitive opportunities, such as the suddenly imposed 
grievances, dramatization of a system’s vulnerability and legitimacy, and the availability 
of master frames, gave the movement its impetus for action.  
Among the structures of political opportunity, the presence of Mousavi and 
Karoubi—the elite allies—had a positive impact on emergence and form of the Green 
Movement. Other structural variables appear in terms of perceptual rather than objective 
opportunities. There were not any changes in regards to institutional access or openness 
into the structure of the system. Rather, perceptions about instability of elite alignments 
and open access to the system, as well as a consensus to change the course of 
Ahmadinejad’s policies encouraged movement adherents to take advantage of minimal 
electoral opportunities. Framing processes are key to the emergence and form of the 
Green Movement. Political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures only mediate 
between these processes. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Grassroots identities and the use of Information Communication 
Technologies have had a positive impact on the emergence and form of the 2009 Green 
Movement.  
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           Movement adherents used ICTs to shape frames that gave values and meaning to 
their actions both before and after the emergence of the Green Movement. Process tracing 
the activities of the adherents on the Internet and the blogosphere supports hypothesis 
two on the positive impact of ICTs in emergence and form of the Green Movement. 
Within almost fifteen years of ICTs’ introduction into the country, they became one of 
the main conversational platforms among different ideologies and adherents of Marxist, 
liberal, leftist, women rights activists, unionists, and the Iranian diaspora who were not 
able to operate freely in the real world. The role of ICTs and blogs in Iran today is 
remarkable in terms of the vast number of voices that find a platform to be heard, the 
space that is provided for these individuals to discuss their views freely, and the wide 
range of topics and discussions that they introduce into the circles of friends and family 
and into the public sphere. 
            The ICTs, and specifically the Internet, also provide a space to access 
information, surpassing the censorship imposed by Tehran. At the height of the Green 
Movement, ICTs, by connecting activists to other adherents, the diaspora, and the 
mainstream media around the world, functioned as the platform for information 
dissemination by the movement adherents and citizen-journalists. They were also used in 
symbolic terms, taking advantage of the social media and Youtube as the main resource 
under repression to discuss and enforce their collective identity.  
           Many of the demonstrations were planned via the Internet, and news with details 
for gatherings disseminated via the Internet into the off-line world. After each 
demonstration, the adherents used Youtube and social media to upload videos and photos 
from the day, and to create symbolic images about the sacrifices in the streets. These 
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videos and images in real-time arouse emotions—especially shock, fear, anger—which 
drew more participants into the movement. The organizational role of the ICTs also 
becomes clear as both the so-called leaders and movement adherents used the ICTs for 
organizing and planning the next steps, as well as publishing their manifestations and the 
Green Movement Charter on the web.   
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the absence of a strong charismatic leadership within the Green 
Movement, there have been limitations on the short-term success of this movement. 
 This diverse and broad-based participation had opened possibilities of leadership 
to many more adherents, and had turned many social media websites and blogs into a 
mode for interaction. The movement was not dependent upon any one blog, nor did the 
adherents follow Mousavi or Karoubi’s every move. The opposition figures themselves 
repeatedly announced that they are only one component of the movement. They appeared 
to be pragmatic and orator types of leaders that tried to delegitimize the Islamic 
Republic’s repression of the Green Movement by seeking to take advantage of Iran’s 
Constitution through non-violent means. During the height of the elections, the Green 
Movement enjoyed a networked-based leadership, from the election campaign to the 
demonstrations it has proven to be a movement based on network of individuals and not a 
hierarchical leadership.            
            The movement leadership is de-centralized. On one side are the reformist groups, 
which because of three decades of cooperation and political activity are better 
coordinated and act within a more organized framework. But, there are secularists, 
leftists, religious, and groups with gender, ethnic, or tribal interests, trying to coordinate 
their activities with their core movement and with others under the umbrella of the Green 
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Movement. Furthermore, the movement leadership is based on compromises. The 
activists of the Green Movement have shown that they can build compromises on their 
minimum demand, despite the diversity of ideas and demands. The fact that people 
decided to take part in the elections despite the surveillance of the Guardian Council and 
despite the fact that Mousavi and Karoubi both insisted on their loyalty to Islamic 
Republic’s system, shows that the activists can categorize and prioritize their demands 
and take action based on that.81   
Hypothesis Three suggests that without a charismatic leader, the movement has 
not been successful. The analysis of the leadership style in the Green movement indicates 
that there is actually a lack of charismatic leadership in the movement. This supports the 
first half of the hypothesis. The movement has not been successful in achieving its initial 
goals thus far. However, we cannot attribute its initial failure to a lack of a charismatic 
leader. Perhaps the findings most relevant to this study are the many ways grassroots took 
advantage of their identities and used ICTs as tools for information, conversation, and 
organization, as well as, the network-based, de-centralized, and non-hierarchical nature of 
the Green Movement. These are clear indications that charismatic leaders who might 
advocate for a specific ideology are not welcomed among the adherents. Rather, there are 
indications of civic agency, and a hope that the movement adherents are able to take 
advantage of each individual’s creativity and responsibility to move the movement goals 
and strategies forward when and if they decide to go into mass-protest again.  
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THE THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  
Conventional theories of social movements suggest that ‘objective’ changes in the 
structure of political opportunities shape framing processes that further undermine the 
legitimacy of a system and thus triggering the emergence and form of a social movement. 
The findings of this study drawn from the hypotheses, however, suggest otherwise. There 
were not any objective openings and changes in terms of access to the institutions of the 
Islamic Republic or shifts in the elite alignments in case of the Green Movement. Rather, 
the ‘cognitive liberation’ occurring by relative deprivation of movement adherents vis a 
vis the system and the social identities made and politicized by the initial shock of a 
‘stolen vote’ triggered the emergence and shaped the form that the Green Movement took 
later on. 
Perhaps the findings that contribute most to testing and development of social 
movement theories under authoritarian rule are the degrees of agency found among the 
grassroots. The adherents were not just followers of a charismatic leader; rather, they 
framed the movement’s goals and strategies and acted upon them. Identities of what Asef 
Bayat (2010) calls ‘nonmovements’ were politicized and went into mass-protest by 
taking advantage of their already existing informal social movement networks. 
Nonmovements by themselves are unlikely to become an effective force for change, 
however, unless “they become mobilized on a collective basis, their struggles linked to 
broader social movements and civil society organizations” (Bayat, 65).  Yet by creating a 
space for individual agency and initiative, and for loose networks of visibility and 
solidarity, social nonmovements can both promote active citizenship in the immediate 
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domains of everyday life (249) and, under the right circumstances, support broad-scale 
efforts to reform the state. 
Revisiting table 1.1: The Political Process Dynamics Figure, from the literature 
review and putting the framing processes at the center, I argue that the political 
opportunity structures are necessary but not sufficient variables in accounting for 
emergence and form of social movements under authoritarian and closed conditions (i.e. 
the Arab Spring).  
Figure 5.1. The Political Process Dynamics Figure 
Structure of political 
opportunity à   
Strategic framing 
ß  à  
Mobilizing structures 
ß   
Openness/closure of the 
system  
Ideologies/identities 
(perceived legitimacy) 
Leaders 
Cracks among elites Information Technologies Grassroots/SMOs 
Elite allies  Informal social movement 
networks  
Information Technologies 
The degree of repression  Informal social movement 
networks 
International 
pressure/Isolation 
  
State’s centralization of 
economic power 
  
Failed reforms   
 
Theories of social movements should move beyond the flaw of structure of political 
opportunities that borrow their advantage mainly from the simplicity of rational choice 
models. Rather the scholarship should examine closely the elements that draw upon 
bounded cognitive abilities of movement adherents, which construct the opportunities, 
goals, and strategies of a particular social movement. The framing processes and the way 
	   119	  
the adherents try to exploit the minimal ‘perceptual’ opportunities under closed systems 
should be core when accounting for emergence and form of a social movement. The 
focus then would be on how the political opportunity structures and mobilizing 
mechanisms interact and are both impacted by and impact the core framing processes 
when identities of ordinary citizens are politicized.    
PROSPECTS FOR THE GREEN MOVEMENT  
The Green Movement was framed by agency of hundreds of thousands of Iranians 
who defined its goals and strategies in non-violent terms and under the umbrella of a 
“stolen vote.” The movement adherents and activists were not consumers of a charismatic 
figure’s words and efforts, rather were each contributors to the cause; from framing the 
identities to determining the movement’s strategies.  
Currently (as of February 2012), both Mousavi and Karoubi are under house 
arrest. In their absence, the ‘coordinating council of the green path of hope’ (Shora-e 
Hamahangi Rah-e Sabz-e Omid), which its members include some of Mousavi and 
Karoubi’s advisors during the 2009 elections, publishes statements and invite the 
adherents to take part in street demonstrations in occasions such as supporting the 
uprisings of the Arab Spring. The ninth Majles elections will be held on March 2, 2012. 
Mohammad Khatami, the former president and ‘the father of reform’ in Iran has 
published three conditions to be met before the reformists would consider taking part in 
the elections. These conditions are: freedom of all political prisoners, holding free and 
fair elections, and full implementation of Iran’s Constitution.82 In a statement, the 
‘coordinating council of the green path of hope,’ has also asked the reformists and the 
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Green Movement adherents to boycott the upcoming elections since the conditions are 
not favorable.83 Many well-known figures of the reform camp also boycotted the March 
2012 Majles elections.  
Whether the reformist camp is trying to re-generate its position as seeking reform 
within the established current system, or as an opposition camp is not yet clear. In both 
cases, these organizers and figures, alongside boycotting the elections and setting 
conditions for participation, should draw strategies that target ‘micro-level’ organization 
and framing processes among ordinary citizens. Putting the emphasis only on the 
machinery of a regime’s source of legitimacy-seeking would not result in a sustained 
social movement that may achieve its goals. 
There is a difference between an organizing authority and a charismatic figure 
that leads a social movement’s agenda according to his in-group ideology. These 
organizers should take advantage of the potential for agency among Green Movement 
adherents to strengthen the ‘informal social movement networks’ without trying to 
anchor their diverse identities into an expert-type conversation that draws strategies for 
the ‘followers.’ They should take advantage of the Internet not just for transferring 
information about street demonstrations, but as a tool to foster conversation among 
different backgrounds and ideologies in order to name, frame and make decisions about 
current issues relevant to the movement, and identify resources, as well as organizing 
across the diversity of the movement adherents to transfer the strategies to the off-line 
world. Unless they do so, the movement will not achieve its potential to take advantage 
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of each individual and their digital nodes when perceptions of structural vulnerability of 
the system are high and thus motivations for participation arises. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
This study is based on process-tracing the movement leaders and adherents’ 
strategies and activities by using the information available on the Internet. Due to the 
novelty of the movement and limitations in accessing official data, this study suffers from 
shortcomings in data collection. I had to gather data mainly from the Internet and Iran’s 
official ministry graphs that sometimes lack accuracy or are outdated. Researching the 
ICTs, with their broad worldwide penetration and reach, risks reporting patterns and 
interactions on the web that might seem relevant but might not be initiated by movement 
adherents from inside Iran. For instance, in some cases it is hard to distinguish whether or 
not some Facebook or Twitter messages are posted by activists from inside Iran or by the 
Iranian diaspora residing outside of the country. Another limitation is the lack of access 
to the opposition figures. Conducting interviews with Karoubi and Mousavi would have 
made the conclusions of this study about the networked based, de-centralized, and non-
hierarchical type of leadership and organization more clear.  
            This research is focused on the emergence and form of the Green movement after 
the 2009 elections in Iran. A more systematic study of variables identified in this study to 
examine their causal relationship with success and failure of the movement in achieving 
its goals would be an illustrative next step. The framing processes were recognized 
central to the timing and the form that the movement took during the height of the 
elections. It is interesting to examine their impact on success or failure of such broad-
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based social movement and their interaction with political opportunity structures and 
resource mobilization. This would provide grounds both for theory testing, as well as 
directions for activists to build upon most relevant aspects to success of social 
movements.  
The scope of this study also did not allow for in depth analysis of each element of 
the political opportunity structures in their interaction to other variables. Capacities of 
Iranian grassroots and the middle-class and the values and meanings that they collectively 
gave to Green Movement have most impacted the emergence and form of the movement. 
But these framing processes were constantly impacted by structural variables. The most 
stable element of political opportunity that took the momentum of the movement was the 
degree of repression. It is useful to conduct a study on organizational variables that can 
impact the success of a particular movement when facing a harsh degree of power and 
repression. As the Green Movement adherents framed their strategies around a non-
violent framework, it would be of interest to investigate these strategies and structural 
and organizational variables that have impacted the movement failure in achieving its 
initial goals so far. This would identify the shortcomings as well as some new strategies 
to keep the momentum of the movement. 
Other structural variables such as the state of the economy at the time of the 
movement are interesting to investigate. Are economic hardships sufficient to explain the 
emergence and timing of a broad-based social movement? Is an oil producing economy 
less susceptible to challenge by opposition activists? Or does it have more capabilities 
and options to repress? Does oil production create authoritarian governments that provide 
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services to citizens in exchange for their consent? What are the prospects for 
democratization in major oil-producing countries in the Middle East? 
Questions about regime transitions or democratization more specifically are 
interesting subjects for research. As Bayat (2010) notes, as a result of the authoritarian 
and closed nature of most states in the Middle East, along with the inward-focused nature 
of existing civic organizations in the area, the best hope for democratic reform in Middle 
Eastern countries is not civic organizations or NGOs but the quiet encroachment of social 
nonmovements. The fact that the 2009 demonstrations came out of elections, and were 
broadly organized by loose networks of individuals among family and friends, raises 
questions and hope about aspirations of Iranians for equality, freedom, and self-
determination and finally democratization.  
The movement adherents had decided to take advantage of minimal democratic 
mechanisms and called for a national referendum as the legitimacy of the Islamic 
Republic eroded with its un-responsiveness to demands for vote cancellation. The “quiet 
enchantment” spaces are already created in Iran and most Middle Eastern countries; it is 
interesting to further investigate the relationship of the opportunities they provide for 
agency and deliberation among the grassroots and their impact on the path towards 
democratization. Questions also arise about which type of change along the social 
movements’ spectrum—from revolutionary to gradual nonviolent reforms—would more 
than others brighten the prospects for democratization or political liberalization 
throughout the Middle East.  
The findings and analyses of this thesis provide empirical evidence for 
scholarship on flourishing of informal social ties among citizens facing up to 
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authoritarian governments (specifically in the Middle East) and their positive uses of 
ICTs in order to organize and disseminate information. As John Dewey puts it, the 
democratic process at the individual level,  
consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and 
directing the activities of the groups in which one belongs and in participating 
according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of 
the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in 
harmony with the interests and goods which are common (Dewey, 1988, p.327-8). 
 
The scholarship on social movements should pay more attention to the bottom-up 
framing processes that render a state’s power vulnerable, rather than only structural 
variables that might have only slightly changed when a social movement erupts. 
Reducing citizens’ role in these countries to voters and protesters who only support the 
machinery of democracy without paying attention to its civic responsibilities is 
misleading. The case of the Green Movement indicates that adherents are able to face up 
to the authoritarian rule; unite over a ‘common good’ and make compromises despite 
their differences. The ‘polycentrism’ surrounding the movement indicates civic agency 
and responsibility on the part of the adherents with several decision-making and activity 
nodes.  
In many authoritarian states, the Internet and especially the blogosphere may be 
the only ‘public sphere’ where citizens can interact and share censored information. One 
focus of the scholarship should be investigating strategies that enable the activists to use 
the ICTs as tools to foster sustained conversation free of exclusion. In this study of civic 
agency facing up to authoritarian power, it is interesting to investigate the potential of 
ICTs to be used as tools that build upon associations of individuals for discussion, 
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consultation, persuasion and debate in decision-making and organizing among each of the 
centers of activity and the adherents of social movements.    
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A:  
LIST OF FARSI WEBSITES AND BLOGS  
 
WEBSITES  
Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies website:            
http://www.ict.gov.ir/home-en.html  
The Islamic Iranian alumni organization website : http://advarnews.biz/ 
Kaleme :  www.kaleme.com  
Rahe Sabz : www.rahesabz.net  
Jmhourikhahi : www.jomhourikhahi.com  
Balatarin : www.balatarin.com  
Rooz Online : www.roozonline.com  
BBC Persian : www.bbcpersian.com  
VOA News : http://www.voanews.com/persian/news/ 
DW- Persian :  http://www.dw-world.de/dw/0,,641,00.html  
Radio Farda : www.radiofarda.com  
 
BLOGS  
Green Revolution : http://greenrevolutioniran.blogspot.com/ 
Az Sarzamin-e past :  http://fromnederland.blogspot.com/ 
Tahavol-e Sabz :  http://tahavolesabz.com/ 
Green Correspondants : http://www.greencorrespondents.com/ 
Iran Green Voice : http://irangreenvoice.com/ 
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APPENDIX B: 
IRAN’S 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS AND VOTER TURNOUT 
 
The information section of Iran’s Interior Ministry announced the results of the 10th 
Presidential Elections as follows: 
Total of the votes: 39165191, Turnout: close to 85 percent  
1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 24527516 votes, close to 62.63 percent  
2. Mir-Hossein Mousavi with 13216411votes, close to 33.75 percent 
3. Mohsen Rezaii with 678240 votes, close to 1.73 percent 
4. Mehdi Karoubi with 333635 votes, close to 0.85 percent  
Null votes: 409389, close to 04.1 percent of the total.  
 
 
 
Source: Islamic Republic of Iran’s official interior ministry website. Retrieved from: 
http://moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=832a711b-95fe-
4505-8aa3-38f5e17309c9&LayoutID=dd8faff4-f71b-4c65-9aef-
a1b6d0160be3&ID=5e30ab89-e376-434b-813f-8c22255158e1  
Translation by the author. 
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APPENDIX C: 
CHART OF IRAN’S POWER STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BBC World News website. Retrieved from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/    
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